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CYBER DETERRENCE
Eric Talbot Jensen∗
ABSTRACT
Cyber operations by both state actors and non-state actors are increasing
in frequency and severity. As nations struggle to defend their networks and
infrastructure, their ability to apply the principles of deterrence to cyber
activities correspondingly increases in importance.
Cyber deterrence offers much more flexibility and increased options from
traditional deterrence methodologies developed in the Cold War’s nuclear
age. In addition to traditional retaliation, cyber deterrence includes options
such as taking legal action and making networks invisible, resilient, and
interdependent. It also presents new ways to view and apply accepted
methodologies such as invulnerability.
As the United States continues to develop and implement cyber deterrence
strategies and capabilities, there are important legal issues that require
consideration, including international law, the law of armed conflict, and U.S.
domestic law. This Article will identify and discuss six prominent theories of
cyber deterrence and briefly analyze legal issues associated with this vital area
of national security. The law not only provides important factors that must be
considered as cyber deterrence doctrine is solidified, but it also provides
significant insights into how these theories of cyber deterrence can best be
utilized to support national strategic goals.

∗ Associate Professor, Brigham Young University Law School. The author wishes to thank Ryan Fisher
and Brigham Udall for their exceptional research and editing assistance.
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Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy the fear
to attack.

Dr. Strangelove1
INTRODUCTION
In July 2011, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III
announced that a few months earlier, more than 24,000 Department of Defense
(the “DoD”) computer files had been stolen by hackers who had gained access
to the DoD’s computer systems.2 A few months prior to that announcement,
one of the U.S. Government’s key scientific labs was hacked and large
amounts of information were taken.3 In neither case has the U.S. Government
made any statement about the hackers’ identity. However, in both cases, there
was speculation that the origin of the attack was a foreign nation.4
These are just two examples in a long line of continuous and pervasive
cyber “attacks”5 on U.S. Government computer systems.6 In any 24-hour
period, roughly seven million DoD-owned computers access the Internet7 and
1 DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB (Hawk Films 1964)
[hereinafter DR. STRANGELOVE].
2 Karen Parrish, Lynn: Cyber Strategy’s Thrust is Defensive, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. (July 14, 2011),
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64682.
3 Kim Zetter, Top Federal Lab Hacked in Spear-Phishing Attack, WIRED (Apr. 20, 2011 1:16 AM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/04/oak-ridge-lab-hack.
4 The 2011 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace acknowledges that “many
foreign nations are working to exploit DoD unclassified and classified networks, and some foreign intelligence
organizations have already acquired the capacity to disrupt elements of DoD’s information infrastructure.”
DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE 1 (2011). The GAO
reports that “[i]n February 2011, the Deputy Secretary of Defense said that more than 100 foreign intelligence
agencies have tried to breach DOD computer networks and that one was successful in breaching networks
containing classified information.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-421, DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT CYBER EFFORTS 1 (2011).
5 Use of the word “attack” to describe a vast array of computer operations is extremely imprecise. It is
used here only to parallel common usage. In legal terms, “attack” has significant meaning under international
law. See Paul A. Walker, Rethinking Computer Network “Attack”: Implications for Law and U.S. Doctrine, 1
NAT’L SECURITY L. BRIEF 33, 34 (2011); Kim Taipale, Cyber Deterrence, in LAW, POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY:
CYBERTERRORISM, INFORMATION WARFARE, DIGITAL AND INTERNET IMMOBILIZATION (Pauline C. Reich &
Eduardo Gelbstein eds., 2012). The use of the word attack is also a matter of definitional debate for the
argument of how to respond to cyber activities. See Oona Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 817, 822–37 (2012) (proposing a definition of cyber attack).
6 Duncan B. Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 374–75 (2011).
7 Joshua E. Kastenberg, Changing the Paradigm of Internet Access from Government Information
Systems: A Solution to the Need for the DoD to Take Time-Sensitive Action on the NIPRNET, 64 A.F. L. REV.
175, 183 (2009).
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“Homeland Security counted 37,258 attacks on government and private
networks [in 2008], compared with 4,095 in 2005.”8 A recent Center for
Strategic and International Studies report stated:
[T]he Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, and
Commerce; NASA; and National Defense University all suffered
major intrusions by unknown foreign entities. The unclassified email
of the secretary of defense was hacked, and DOD officials told us
that the department’s computers are probed hundreds of thousands of
times each day. A senior official at the Department of State told us
the department had lost “terabytes” of information. Homeland
Security suffered break-ins in several of its divisions, including the
Transportation Security Agency. The Department of Commerce was
forced to take the Bureau of Industry and Security off-line for several
months, and NASA has had to impose e-mail restrictions before
shuttle launches and allegedly has seen designs for new launchers
9
compromised.

The government is certainly not alone as a target for malicious computer
operations. Private businesses are also being hacked at an alarming rate. In a
recent incident targeting “proprietary corporate data, e-mails, credit-card
transaction data and login credentials at companies in the health and
technology industries,” more than 75,000 computers at more than 2,500
businesses in 196 countries were targeted.10 The presumed targets in these
attacks were intellectual property and proprietary information that could be
translated into economic gain for the attackers.11 According to Ty Sagalow,
chairman of the Internet Security Alliance board of directors, “[a]n estimated
$1 trillion was lost in the United States in 2008 through cyber attacks.”12 This
8

Siobhan Gorman, Bush Looks to Beef Up Protection Against Cyberattacks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2008,

at A9.
9

COMM’N ON CYBERSECURITY FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES,
SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY 12–13 (2008).
10 Ellen Nakashima, Large Worldwide Cyber Attack Uncovered, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2010, at A3.
11 See id.
12 William Matthews, Cyber War’s ‘Front Lines’ May Be in Private Hands, DEF. NEWS, Dec. 7, 2009, at
38, available at 2009 WLNR 25655553; see DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4, at 4 (stating that “[e]very year, an
amount of intellectual property larger than that contained in the Library of Congress is stolen from networks
maintained by U.S. businesses, universities, and governmental departments and agencies.”). The United States
is not alone in this area. According to recent reports, China is suffering from severe criminal activity that is
causing serious domestic problems. “The annual worth of China’s ‘hacker industry’ is now over 238 million
yuan (about $34.8 million), causing upwards of 7.6 billion yuan (about $1.1 billion) in losses . . . . The number
of computers in China controlled by ‘botnets’ tops the list worldwide.” Tang Lan & Zhang Xin, The View from
China: Can Cyber Deterrence Work?, in GLOBAL CYBER DETERRENCE: VIEWS FROM CHINA, THE U.S.,
RUSSIA, INDIA, AND NORWAY 1, 2 (Andrew Nagorski ed. 2010) [hereinafter GLOBAL CYBER DETERRENCE]. But
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is more than the annual Gross Domestic Product of all but the top nineteen
countries in the world.13
Among the most worrisome of hacking incidents are those focused on
critical national infrastructure.14 This infrastructure is the backbone of United
States’ transportation and economic systems.15 The cost of downtime alone
from major attacks on critical national infrastructure “exceeds . . . $6 million
per day.”16 The attacks have caused President Barack Obama to recently state,
From now on, our digital infrastructure—the networks and computers
we depend on every day—will be treated as they should be: as a
strategic national asset. Protecting this infrastructure will be a
national security priority. We will ensure that these networks are
secure, trustworthy and resilient. We will deter, prevent, detect, and
defend against attacks and recover quickly from any disruptions or
17
damage.

President Obama’s recognition of the role and importance of deterring
malicious cyber operations, including cyber attacks, incorporates the
traditional notions of deterrence to this modern risk to national security.

see Robert Vamosi, The Myth of that $1 Trillion Cybercrime Figure, SECURITYWEEK (Aug. 3, 2012), http://
www.securityweek.com/myth-1-trillion-cybercrime-figure.
13 CIA, Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), CIA WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (based on 2011
estimates) (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
14 As defined in the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001, critical national infrastructure “means
systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction
of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2006); see also DEP’T OF
DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE NO. 3020.40, DOD POLICY AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE 19, 20 (2010); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 63,
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (1998).
15 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(b).
16 STEWART BAKER ET AL., IN THE CROSSFIRE: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AGE OF CYBER WAR 3
(2010).
17 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure (May 29,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Securing-OurNations-Cyber-Infrastructure. This sentiment was echoed by U.S. Cyber Command’s General Alexander,
“[t]his increased inter-connectedness of our information systems, combined with the growing sophistication of
cyber criminals and foreign intelligence actors, has increased our risk. Our inter-connectedness is now a
national security issue.” Budget Request for Information Technology and Cyber Operations Programs:
Hearing on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 and Oversight of Previously
Authorized Programs, Before the Subcomm. on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the H. Comm on Armed
Services, 112th Cong. 6 (March 20, 2012) [hereinafter Budget Request for Information Technology and Cyber
Operations Programs] (statement of General Keith B. Alexander, Commander, United States Cyber
Command).
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Deterrence has been a part of Western political security doctrine since ancient
Greece18 and played a particularly key role in the post-World War II nuclear
world.19 It is equally important in today’s world of cyber operations20 and will
continue to play a key role in the U.S. national security strategy.21 In fact, just
as cyber operations offer unique capabilities as tools to accomplish national
goals,22 they also present distinctive aspects of deterrence, both in line with
traditional notions of deterrence and also some innovative and progressive
ways of viewing deterrence.23
As the United States continues to develop and implement cyber deterrence
strategies and capabilities,24 there are important legal issues that require
consideration, including international law, the law of armed conflict
(“LOAC”), and U.S. domestic law. This Article will identify and discuss six
prominent theories of cyber deterrence and analyze legal issues associated with
this vital area of national security. The law not only provides important factors
18 See ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & RICHARD SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 12 (1974).
19 GREVILLE RUMBLE, THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR DEFENSE 42, 71 (1985) (explaining mutually assured
destruction in nuclear deterrence).
20 M. Elaine Bunn, Can Deterrence Be Tailored?, STRATEGIC FORUM, Jan. 2007, at 1, 5; Elaine
Grossman, Top General: US Needs Fresh Look at Deterrence, Nuclear Triad, NATIONALJOURNAL (July 15,
2011),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/top-general-u-s-needs-fresh-look-at-deterrencenuclear-triad-20110715.
21 DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 14, at 2, 5 (outlining DoD policy and responsibilities for critical
infrastructure).
22 See Budget Request for Information Technology and Cyber Operations Programs, supra note 17, at 7
(statement of General Keith B. Alexander, Commander, United States Cyber Command) (stating that “our
cyber capabilities represent key components of deterrence.”); MARTIN C. LIBICKI, CYBERDETERRENCE AND
CYBERWAR 125–26 (2009) (discussing the potential use of cyber attacks in offensive military operations).
23 LIBICKI, supra note 22, at xvi–xix.
24 As cyber capabilities have been developed and increased, the United States military has gone through
an evolution of how to utilize and control these capabilities. Initially, cyber activities were placed under the
U.S. military’s Strategic Command, or STRATCOM. STRATCOM is the unified command tasked with
maintenance and readiness of the United States’ nuclear arsenal and was created in response to the Cold War
with the Soviet Union. STRATCOM’s mission is to “[d]etect, deter, and prevent attacks against the United
States and our allies - join with the other combatant commands to defend the nation should deterrence fail.”
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (USSTRATCOM), FACT SHEET (Dec. 2011), http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/
snapshot. As cyber operations grew as a threat to U.S. national security, STRATCOM was also given the task
to “[b]uild cyberspace capability and capacity.” U.S STRATEGIC COMMAND, MISSION (Apr. 2011), http://www.
stratcom.mil/mission. In 2009, U.S. Cyber Command, or CYBERCOM, was created and its mission as of
December 2011 follows: “USCYBERCOM is responsible for planning, coordinating, integrating,
synchronizing, and directing activities to operate and defend the Department of Defense information networks
and when directed, conducts full-spectrum military cyberspace operations (in accordance with all applicable
laws and regulations) in order to ensure U.S. and allied freedom of action in cyberspace, while denying the
same to our adversaries.” U.S. CYBER COMMAND, FACT SHEET (Dec. 2011), http://www.stratcom.mil/
factsheets/Cyber_Command.
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that must be considered as cyber deterrence doctrine is solidified, but also
provides significant insights into how these theories of cyber deterrence can
best be utilized to support national strategic goals.
Part I of this Article will examine some basic principles of deterrence that
affect the application of the law, such as the difficulties of attribution and
signaling. Part II will then outline six prominent theories of cyber deterrence
and briefly describe some legal issues associated with them, including an
analysis of how the law is an important consideration in applying these
theories in modern U.S. national security strategy. The Article will conclude in
Part III.
I. DETERRENCE AND CYBER OPERATIONS
The goal of deterrence is to prevent aggressive action . . . by ensuring
that, in the mind of a potential adversary, the risks of the action
outweigh the benefits, while taking into account the consequences of
25
inaction.

As mentioned in the Introduction, deterrence theory is not a new
phenomenon26 and has played a significant role in national security theory.27
With the modern development of cyber operations, the U.S. Government, as
well as academics and practitioners, have turned their attention to cyber
deterrence.28 The nature of cyber operations has caused some to diminish the
potential role for deterrence. Tang Lan and Zhang Xin have written “the
anonymity, the global reach, the scattered nature, and the interconnectedness of
information networks greatly reduce the efficacy of cyber deterrence and can
even render it completely useless.”29 Despite this competing view, cyber
25

Bunn, supra note 20, at 1.
See generally RUMBLE, supra note 19, at 42–73 (outlining the history of deterrence theory in practice
in Western history).
27 See GEORGE & SMOKE, supra note 18, at 12–21; AUSTIN LONG, DETERRENCE: FROM COLD WAR TO
LONG WAR 2–4 (2008); Christopher Achen & Duncan Snidal, Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative
Case Studies, 41 WORLD POLITICS 143, 143 (1989); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear
Proliferation, and National Missile Defense, 27 INT’L SECURITY 86, 88 (2003). U.S. Strategic Command, the
command under which CYBERCOM works, has an annual deterrence symposium that discusses deterrence
issues, though it often focuses on nuclear deterrence. See 2012 U.S Strategic Command Deterrence
Symposium, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, http://www.stratcomds.com (last visited Sept. 22, 2012).
28 CHARLES L. GLASER, DETERRENCE OF CYBER ATTACKS AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 2 (2011);
LIBICKI, supra note 22, at 5; Kenneth Geers, The Challenge of Cyber Attack Deterrence, 26 COMPUTER L. &
SECURITY REV. 298, 298 (2010); Will Goodman, Cyber Deterrence: Tougher in Theory Than in Practice?,
STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Fall 2010, at 102, 102.
29 Tang & Zhang, supra note 12, at 1.
26
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deterrence continues to increase in importance30 as nations struggle with the
vulnerability of both government and private sector cyber systems.
Before discussing the prominent cyber deterrence theories and the
attending legal issues, some comment on the unique aspects of cyber
deterrence will be useful.
A. Assumptions
In approaching this topic, some assumptions are necessary. These
assumptions undergird the subsequent legal analysis but are relatively
uncontroversial, particularly in the cyber domain.
1. Full Spectrum Deterrence Required
The initial assumption is that cyber deterrence is required across a much
greater spectrum than most other weapons and actors, and certainly than was
present in the post-World War II discussion of nuclear deterrence.31
Cyber operations are inherently different than many other weapons that
harness state level violence, in that they are accessible to a broad range of
actors including but not limited to states.32 For example, only states, and very
few of those, have ever developed a nuclear capability.33 On the other hand,
more than 140 nations are reported to have or be developing cyber weapons,34
and more than thirty countries are creating cyber units in their militaries.35 The
recent Stuxnet malware36 has been labeled by some as the first real example of

30

Goodman, supra note 28, at 1.
Richard L. Kugler, Deterrence of Cyber Attacks, in CYBERPOWER AND NATIONAL SECURITY 309, 310
(Franklin D. Kramer et al., eds., 2009).
32 Taipale, supra note 5, at 8. Taipale divides potential attackers into three categories: 1) those who may
be deterred directly; 2) those who may be deterred indirectly by others; and 3) those who may not be easily
deterred at all. Id. at 9–10.
33 Cf. Hollis, supra note 6, at 407 (explaining that hacking skills are more universally distributed
worldwide due to being inexpensive and easy to obtain unlike nuclear weaponization).
34 Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Casualties, 13 SMU SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 249, 249 (2010); see Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with
an Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F. L. REV. 65, 96 (2009).
35 William J. Lynn, III, The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, One Year Later: Defending Against the Next
Cyberattack, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 28, 2011), www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68305/william-j-lynn-iii/thepentagons-cyberstrategy-one-year-later.
36 Mark Clayton, Stuxnet Attack on Iran Nuclear Program Came about A YEAR AGO, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 3, 2011, at 3; Richard Adhikari, Stuxnet: Dissecting the Worm, TECHNEWS WORLD (Aug. 16,
2010), http://www.technewsworld.com/story/70622.html.
31
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a cyber “armed attack” in violation of the UN Charter, if it proves to have been
carried out by a nation or its agents.37
The computer security giant Symantec believes that a cyber threat such as
Stuxnet could be created by as few as five to ten highly trained computer
technicians in as little as six months.38 Many non-state actors with malicious
intentions could muster those resources and use them to create significant
damage. Additionally, very effective hacking tools are readily available for
purchase on the Internet by anyone desiring to conduct cyber crime.39 For
example, two Chinese authors have written that:
Citibank . . . suffered tens of millions of dollars in losses at the hands
of criminals using “Black Energy” malware, which can be purchased
online for only $40. And the “Zeus Trojan” and its variants that
attacked 74,000 computers across 196 countries are also available
40
online for a mere $700.

In a recent statement before Congress, General Keith Alexander, head of Cyber
Command and the National Security Agency, stated “[i]n 2010 we saw cyber
capabilities in use that could damage or disrupt digitally controlled systems
and networked devices, and in some cases we are not sure whether these
capabilities are under the control of a foreign government.”41 The ability for
non-state actors and even individuals to harness the power of cyber weapons
and use them at their discretion, with significant effects,42 has a serious impact
on deterrence that was not an issue with the nuclear threat.43 In fact, “Russian
experts believe that it is criminals and terrorists who present the greatest threat
to the security of transnational cyberspace.”44

37 See Gary D. Brown, Why Iran Didn’t Admit Stuxnet Was an Attack, JOINT FORCES Q., 4th Quarter
2011, at 70, 71.
38 Josh Halliday, STUXNET Worm is the ‘Work of a National Government Agency,’ GUARDIAN (Sept. 24,
2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/sep/24/stuxnet-worm-national-agency.
39 Tang & Zhang, supra note 12, at 1.
40 Id.
41 Budget Request for Information Technology and Cyber Operations Programs, supra note 17, at 3
(statement of General Keith B. Alexander, Commander, United States Cyber Command).
42 Siobhan Gorman, Alert on Hacker Power Play, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2012, at A3; Alistair Stevenson,
AntiSec: Anonymous Hackers Strike Again in “Turkish Takedown Thursday,” INT’L BUS. TIMES NEWS (July 7,
2011),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/175785/20110707/antisec-anonymous-hackers-turkey-hack-opera
tion-anti-security-internet-lulzsec-redhack.htm.
43 Tang & Zhang, supra note 12, at 1.
44 Dmitry I. Grigoriev, Russian Priorities and Steps Towards Cybersecurity, in GLOBAL CYBER
DETERRENCE, supra note 12, at 5.
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Additionally, cyber operations allow an adversary to accomplish a broad
spectrum of effects. In nuclear deterrence, the effects were usually considered
catastrophic, allowing a limited number of responses.45 In cyber operations,
effects can be as small as the penetration of a system to observe what that
system does,46 or the defacing of a web site.47 The effects can also be as large
as destroying almost 1000 centrifuges, as Stuxnet is supposed to have done,48
or an electronic version of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as some warn about.49
This means that cyber deterrence theory must embrace a much larger
spectrum of potential adversaries and account for being able to deter a much
more diverse type of actor than most other previous modalities. Cyber
deterrence must apply to the full spectrum of actors, from individuals to
nations, and consider the full spectrum of actions, from small invasions into
computer systems to large scale “attacks” that produce significant kinetic
effects.
This spectrum of potential attacks and attackers requires deterrence to be
considered on at least two planes: general and specific. General deterrence is
designed to apply broadly and in advance of any potential attack.50 For
example, having a nuclear arsenal that can be used in response to various
attacks of various kinds is a general deterrent.51 It deters everyone without
reference to a specific incident or threat. In the cyber realm, there are certain
actions, such as installing a firewall, that apply as a general deterrent to all
actors.52 Specific deterrence, or what is now being termed “tailored

45

Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory, 4 INT’L SECURITY 54, 57 (1979).
Siobhan Gorman et al., Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet Project, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2009, at
A1–A2.
47 Kevin Andersen, White House Website Attacked, BBC NEWS (May 5, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/americas/1313753.stm.
48 David Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012,
at A1.
49 Michiko Kakutani, The Attack Coming From Bytes, Not Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, at C1
(statement of cyber defense expert Richard Clarke); Leon E. Panetta, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Remarks at Town
Hall Meeting (Mar. 2, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=4989) (warning that “the next Pearl Harbor could very well be a cyberattack that takes down our
power grid system, that takes down our government systems, that takes down our financial systems.”).
50 Taipale, supra note 5, at 14; see Paul Huth & Bruce Russett, General Deterrence Between Enduring
Rivals: Three Competing Models, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 61, 61 (1993).
51 See Huth & Russett, supra note 50, at 61–62.
52 Joseph H. Schuessler, General Deterrence Theory: Assessing Information Systems Security
Effectiveness in Large Versus Small Businesses 10–11 (May 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of North Texas), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc9829/m2/1/high_res_
d/dissertation.pdf.
46
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deterrence,”53 is effective in deterring a specific type of cyber operation, a
specific actor, or both.54 In the cyber realm, this might include blocking all
cyber traffic that comes from a particular server, or that carries a particular
type of file. Because a nation must defend its networks against all potential
adversaries with all potential capabilities, deterrence must operate on both
planes to be truly effective.
The factors above lead to the conclusion that deterrence must cover the full
spectrum of actors, types of “attacks,” and levels of action. In other words,
cyber operations require full spectrum dominance if they are to be most
effective.
2. Ineffectiveness Guaranteed
Another assumption concerning cyber deterrence that impacts this paper is
that regardless of how much effort is put into deterrence, it can never be
completely effective.55 This is true not only from a technical perspective,56 but
also from a sociological perspective. Some options that will deter some
potential adversaries will give incentive to others, and there are some actors
who simply cannot be deterred.57
Cyber deterrence can never be completely effective because actions that are
designed to deter one type of actor will only incentivize other actors. For
example, one of the deterrent methodologies that will be discussed below, and
that was one of the main bases of nuclear deterrence, is retaliation, including
kinetic retaliation.58 This was effective in the nuclear era because it was not
difficult to determine who launched the attack. However, in the cyber area, as
will be discussed below,59 not only is it extremely difficult to determine who is

53

Kugler, supra note 31, at 325; Taipale, supra note 5, at 14; Bunn, supra note 20, at 1.
See Taipale, supra note 5, at 14 (“Tailored deterrence is a more precisely targeted kind of specific
deterrence strategy in which policies are tailored to specific actors, situations, capabilities, and
communications.”).
55 Kugler, supra note 31, at 326.
56 William J. Lynn III, U.S. Deputy Sec’y of Def., Remarks on the Department of Defense Cyber
Strategy at the National Defense (July 14, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1593) (stating “no network will ever be perfectly secure.”).
57 PAUL K. DAVIS & BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, DETERRENCE AND INFLUENCE IN COUNTERTERRORISM: A
COMPONENT IN THE WAR ON AL QAEDA 3–5 (2002).
58 Kinetic weapons are those that are associated with heat, blast, and fragmentation, such as a bomb or a
bullet.
59 See infra Part I.B.1.
54
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initiating the cyber incident, but it is also possible to “spoof” your cyber
activity and make it appear that the incident was caused by someone else.60
These inherent aspects of cyber operations would allow one entity to
conduct a significant cyber operation on a target and then make it appear as if
the operation were done by a third entity.61 The target nation, in an attempt to
respond and deter, might unleash a devastating cyber or kinetic attack on the
“framed” entity, causing undeserved destruction.62 In this way, cyber and
kinetic retaliation may deter some entities from conducting cyber attacks
against certain cyber-capable entities but could ironically incentivize others to
conduct such operations, if they could mask or spoof their operation to look
like someone else.63
A final aspect of the assumption of ineffectiveness of cyber deterrence is
that some with cyber capabilities can never be deterred. As a matter of social
theory64 and historical precedent,65 it seems clear that some individuals are so
committed to a certain course of violent action that no methods of deterrence
can be truly effective.66 Rogue states, terrorists,67 and suicide bombers
represent a stark example,68 though some theorists argue that even these
categories of attackers can be deterred in some way.69 If individuals or entities
are willing to commit suicide to accomplish their purposes, it must be assumed
that a similarly committed individual, who can accomplish the same death or

60 China, Not India, Behind Cyber Attacks: US, HINDUSTAN TIMES (India) (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.
hindustantimes.com/world-news/Europe/China-not-India-behind-cyber-attack-US/Article1-800051.aspx
(reporting an attack that was initially claimed to be from India, but actually was likely arranged by China).
61 Id.
62 See Christopher Joyner & Catherine Lotrionte, Information Warfare as International Coercion:
Elements of a Legal Framework, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 825, 859 (2001).
63 See Charles Arthur, China ‘Targeted 48 Chemical and Military Companies in Hacking Attack,’
GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/nov/01/china-hacking-chemicalmilitary-companies (reporting attacks that came from a Chinese national that was hacking from within the
United States); Alert SA07-303A): Federal Trade Commission Reports Spoofed Email (Oct. 30, 2007), http://
www.us-cert.gov/cas/alerts/SA07-303A.html.
64 DAVIS & JENKINS, supra note 57, at 3–5.
65 Bruce Hoffman, The Logic of Suicide Terrorism, ATLANTIC (June 2003), http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2003/06/the-logic-of-suicide-terrorism/2739.
66 DAVIS & JENKINS, supra note 57, at 3–7; Hoffman, supra note 65.
67 Lynn, supra note 56 (Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn, III, remarking that terrorists and
rogue states are more difficult to deter).
68 Twin Suicide Bombers Kill 27 in Syrian Capital, CBS NEWS (Mar. 17, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.
com/8301-202_162-57399452/twin-suicide-bombers-kill-27-in-syrian-capital.
69 Kugler, supra note 31, at 338; Bunn, supra note 20, at 3.
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destruction by means of cyber operations with no immediate personal risk, is
similarly not deterrable.
B. Overarching Issues
In addition to assumptions, there are several overarching issues that, while
vital to truly understanding the legal issues surrounding cyber deterrence,
cannot be fully explored in this Article. However, a brief mention of them will
be helpful here.
1. Attribution
One of the most vexing problems associated with cyber operations is the
issue of attribution. This problem has been highlighted in numerous reports
and writings.70 It revolves around the ability of a victim to identify the
“attacker.” As one commentator has written, “[o]ur continuing inability to
attribute attacks is tantamount to an open invitation to those who would like to
do us harm, whatever their motives.”71
Because of the nature of the Internet, combined with the sophistication of
many attackers, many of the most significant cyber incidents are still
unattributed.72 Ultimately, even determining the computer that generated the
cyber operation does not answer the attribution question unless there is some
way of knowing for certain who was using the computer.73 An attack that can
be traced to a Chinese government computer in the basement of a Chinese
government building does not ensure that a Chinese government agent was
operating on behalf of the Chinese government.74 Rather, it may be a rogue
70 See, e.g., LIBICKI, supra note 22, at 43–51; Hollis, supra note 6, at 397–404; Todd C. Huntley,
Controlling the Use of Force in Cyber Space, 60 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2010). Jonathan Soloman,
Cyberdeterrence Between Nation-States Plausible Strategy or a Pipe Dream?, 5 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 1, 5–10
(2011).
71 Harry D. Raduege, Jr., The View from the United States: Fighting Weapons of Mass Disruption: Why
America Needs a “Cyber Triad,” in GLOBAL CYBER DETERRENCE, supra note 12, at 3, 4.
72 See Lesley Swanson, The Era of Cyber Warfare: Applying International Humanitarian Law to the
2008 Russian–Georgian Cyber Conflict, 32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 303, 319 (2010); cf. Hollis,
supra note 6, at 378 (“In reality . . . anonymity, not attribution, prevails. Current information technology
makes it difficult to identify the actual server from which an attack (or exploit) originates, let alone its
perpetrators.”).
73 See Hollis, supra note 6, at 378; Arthur, supra note 63; Adam Segal, A Chinese View on Why Cyber
Deterrence Is So Hard, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 11, 2012), http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2012/01/11/achinese-view-on-why-cyber-deterrence-is-so-hard/.
74 See Grigoriev, supra note 44, at 6 (stating that “it is often very difficult to reliably determine precisely
what country such [military cyber attacks] were carried out from. And even if the country is identified, it is
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Chinese actor or even an agent of a third country trying to make it appear as if
the Chinese generated the attack.75
The inability to promptly attribute cyber operations provides significant
legal hurdles to effective deterrence. Until the victim knows who is assaulting
his computer systems, it is difficult to know how to deter them. It is always
possible for the victim to unplug the attacked system from the Internet,76 but if
that is a target’s only response, deterrence is not playing an effective role.
Given the difficulties just discussed, two other important factors must be
considered concerning deterrence. First, despite the fact that many attacks
remain unattributed,77 with sufficient time and resources, many attacks can be
attributed with some degree of certainty.78 In fact, many now argue that the
real issue is not attribution, but “prompt” attribution.79 Computer forensics will
often allow eventual attribution,80 but by the time of discovery, the window to
reasonably respond will be gone.
Second, attribution should probably not be characterized as an “either/or”
situation, where one either can correctly attribute or not. In actuality,
attribution is more like a spectrum where over time a victim becomes more and
more sure of who committed the attack.81 The political decision for the victim
nation then becomes how much attribution is required to take a contemplated
action.82 In other words, does the victim nation feel like it has enough

very difficult to prove that attack was carried out specifically by its armed forces.”); N. Korea’s Cyber Warfare
Unit in Spotlight After Attack on S. Korean Bank, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY (May 3, 2011), http://english.
yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/05/03/78/0301000000AEN20110503010600315F.HTML (finding that an
attack originally attributed to hackers in China was in fact committed by North Korean hackers); see also
Segal, supra note 73.
75 Taipale, supra note 5, at 23–24.
76 Zetter, supra note 3.
77 See Hollis, supra note 6, at 378; Swanson, supra note 72, at 319.
78 See, e.g., N. Korea’s Cyber Warfare Unit in Spotlight After Attack on S. Korean Bank, supra note 74;
cf. Hollis, supra note 6, at 377 (explaining that proponents of regulating cybercrime and cyber war assume that
sufficient attribution of the origins of attacks will occur).
79 E.g., Herbert Lin, Chief Scientist, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National
Research Council of the National Academies, Remarks at International Conference on Challenges in
Cybersecurity: Risks, Strategies, and Confidence Building (Dec. 13, 2011).
80 See Soloman, supra note 70, at 6.
81 See id. at 6–8.
82 See id. at 10; Jack Goldsmith, Cybersecurity Treaties: A Skeptical View, HOOVER INSTITUTION, 1, 10
(2011), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges_Goldsmith.pdf (explaining
that the Information Warfare Monitor chose not to act even though it traced the source of a computer hack to
China because it was not fully clear whether a private actor or a government official was responsible for the
attack); Lin, supra note 79.
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attribution to take a specific action? Presumably, less sure attribution would be
sufficient for less serious responses. A forceful response would likely require
more certain attribution.
It may be that some technological innovation will occur or some structural
change will be made to the infrastructure supporting the Internet to make
prompt and accurate attribution less difficult, but until then, attribution will
continue to be a vexing issue for victims that significantly compromises
attempts at deterrence.
2. Signaling
In one of the classic quotes from the movie Dr. Strangelove, which deals
with an inadvertent onset of nuclear war,83 the Russian ambassador describes
Russia’s secret “Doomsday Machine” which was meant to act as a deterrent to
the U.S. nuclear threat.84 In response, Dr. Strangelove says “of course, the
whole point of a Doomsday Machine is lost, if you keep it a secret!”85 Though
dealing with nuclear war, this quote highlights a significant issue in all forms
of deterrence, including cyber deterrence—signaling.
Throughout the history of deterrence, the ability to signal one’s adversaries
was a fundamental principle, both in times of conflict and in times of peace.86
Floating an aircraft carrier through the straits of Taiwan87 or holding a parade
where a nation displays all of its weaponry88 were methods of signaling to an
adversary both capability and intention.89 The ability to clearly signal one’s
capabilities and intentions added clarity to adversarial interactions and allowed

83 See Tim Dirks, Filmsite Movie Review: Dr. Strangelove, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Bomb (1964), FILMSITE, http://www.filmsite.org/drst.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
84 DR. STRANGELOVE, supra note 1.
85 Id.
86 See Bunn, supra note 20, at 6 (“Whether through words or actions, shaping decisions of opponents
does not begin with the crisis; their perceptions may already be well entrenched by then, and it may be difficult
to communicate new messages to leaders in protective bunkers. Communications in peacetime are probably
more important than words said or actions taken in times of tension.”).
87 Patrick E. Tyler, China Warns U.S. To Keep Away From Taiwan Strait, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at
A3.
88 Tania Branigan & Jonathan Watts, China Shows Off Military Might at 60th Anniversary Parade,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/01/china-military-60th-anniversaryparade.
89 Cf. Bunn, supra note 20, at 5 (discussing the need to demonstrate clearly both the capability and the
will to carry out an attack).
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greater impact of deterrent options.90 Signaling in cyber operations is equally
important91 but more difficult for a number of reasons.92
First, because attribution is so fundamentally difficult and cloaking an
adversary’s operations is so beneficial in terms of avoiding a response, openly
announcing cyber capabilities is seldom seen as beneficial.93 Because
anonymity on the Internet is so likely even after a cyber operation, the
incentives to signal capabilities or intentions are diminished.94 With most
weapons, the use of the weapons divulges what state is using them; however,
states can develop and use their cyber capabilities without the use being
attributed to the state, thereby diminishing the benefits of signaling.95
Second, unlike many kinetic weapons, most cyber weapons are “single use”
weapons. In other words, using a cyber tool, or even displaying it, may make it
ineffective.96 For example, Stuxnet took advantage of several “zero-day
exploits.”97 These exploits were unknown defects in a software controller
program that allowed the Stuxnet to do the things it did.98 Once the defects
were used, they became known and “patches”99 were issued which prevented
those same exploits from being issued again.100 In this way, signaling a cyber
weapon often makes it ineffective, which is seldom the case with standard
kinetic weapons.
Third, signaling a target is equally unhelpful. Though the offense can
usually outstrip the defense in cyber operations,101 putting an adversary on
notice as to which networks or computer systems are the target of penetration
or have already been penetrated undermines the attack. It allows the adversary
90

Kugler, supra note 31, at 322.
LIBICKI, supra note 22, at 106.
92 See Taipale, supra note 5 at 16–18 (discussing cyber signaling and its inherent differences and
difficulties).
93 Id. at 27.
94 Id. at 22–23.
95 Id.
96 See, e.g., Liam Murchu, Stuxnet Using Three Additional Zero-Day Vulnerabilities, SYMANTEC
OFFICIAL BLOG (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/stuxnet-using-three-additionalzero-day-vulnerabilities.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, Security Tip (ST04-006): Understanding Patches, USCERT, http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-006.html (last updated July 14, 2009) (defining the term
“patches”).
100 Murchu, supra note 96.
101 Taipale, supra note 5, at 26.
91
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to safeguard information, evict the attacker from the system, or prepare some
other means of foiling the compromise of the target system or network.102
Though there is some similarity here in non-cyber operations, the speed with
which an adversary can move an intended target to a different platform, such
as a different server, is generally much faster in the cyber world.
Together, these three factors make signaling less effective as a means of
creating clarity in the relationship and interactions of potential cyber
adversaries. While signaling can still play a role,103 it appears to be diminished
in comparison with more traditional means of deterrence.
3. Time and Scale
Time and scale of potential malicious cyber operations are also significant
overarching issues that affect cyber deterrence. It is often said that the most
dangerous cyber attack is the one that has not yet been discovered.104 The fact
that an adversary has infiltrated a network is alarming enough; finding out that
he has been there for several years without anyone knowing is much more
problematic. And in cyber operations, an adversary can exfiltrate as much data
in minutes as it would take a human spy to sneak out in years. The sheer speed
at which cyber operations can occur make them fundamentally different than
traditional operations.105
One of the unique aspects of the Internet is that it is generally easier to act
offensively than to defend. This is especially true in the milliseconds of time in
which cyber operations occur. Just as it is much easier to build a cannonball
and find the single point of weakness in the fortifications than it is to build
impregnable walls that surround the entire city,106 it is axiomatic that it is
easier to find an individual weakness in a network or system than it is to

102

See generally id. at 21–28.
Kugler, supra note 31, at 332.
104 Bill Gertz, China Blocks U.S. from Cyber Warfare, WASH. TIMES (May 12, 2009), http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/12/china-bolsters-for-cyber-arms-race-with-us/
(quoting Joel Brenner, the head of U.S. counterintelligence, saying “I worry more about attacks we can’t even
see.”).
105 Gary Brown, Colonel, Staff Judge Advocate U.S. Cyber Command, Keynote Address at The Internet
in Bello: Cyber War, Ethics, & Policy (Nov. 18, 2011) (summary available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/
12032.htm).
106 Helen Starkweather, Endangered Site: Famagusta Walled City, Cyprus, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (March
2009),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/Endangered-Cultural-Treasures-Famagusta-Walled-CityCyprus.html (discussing the use of cannonballs to penetrate city walls).
103
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defend the entire network or system.107 This fact creates a sense of near
hopelessness in some, particularly in the business world, who decide it would
cost more to secure their networks than they would gain from the security.108
In a purely economic model, it is unsurprising that some would choose the path
of least expense.109
Like time, the scale of a malicious cyber operation must be conceived of
differently than typical kinetic operations. In the milliseconds it takes to
conduct an attack, the scale of the damage can be immense. There is a
spectrum across which cyber operations may be categorized, with the “pinprick
attack”110 on one end and Richard Clarke’s “electronic Pearl Harbor”111 on the
other. Great debate rages about the likelihood and effectiveness of either
scenario.112 However, from a deterrence perspective, the resolution matters
little in the short term, as a nation committed to deterrence must prepare for
and defend against both extremes, as well as all scenarios between the two
ends of the spectrum. Similarly, while each different methodology requires a
different deterrent to be truly effective,113 each will also raise separate legal
issues.114
4. Necessity
Finally, it is important to mention briefly the doctrine of necessity. Under
the law that regulates initiation of hostilities, or jus ad bellum, the doctrine of
necessity is a requirement for any self-defense response to an armed attack.115
While the practical application of these principles to cyber operations is of
107 See Lingyu Wang et al., Minimum-cost Network Hardening Using Attack Graphs, 29 COMPUTER
COMM. 3812, 3812 (2006).
108 See Peter Lichtenbaum & Melanie Schneck, The Response to Cyberattacks: Balancing Security and
Cost, 36 INT’L Law. 39, 48 (2002).
109 Cf. Tyler Moore, Introducing the Economics of Cybersecurity: Principles and Policy Options, in
COMMITTEE ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS 9–22 (2010) (proposing several ideas to
incentivize better deterrent methodologies, including cyber insurance).
110 Antoine Lemay, Jose M. Fernandeza & Scott Knight, Pinprick Attacks, A Lesser Included Case?, in
CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT PROCEEDINGS 183, 190 (Christian Czosseck & Karlis Podins eds., 2010).
111 Kakutani, supra note 49, at C1.
112 Paul Roberts, Despite Intrusions, Chances of US–China Cyberwar Are Small, KASPERSKY LAB
SECURITY NEWS SERV. (March 1, 2012), https://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/despite-intrusions-chances-uschina-cyber-war-are-small-030112.
113 See supra notes 110–11.
114 See supra notes 110–11.
115 Craig J.S. Forrest, The Doctrine of Military Necessity and the Protection of Cultural Property During
Armed Conflicts, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 177, 179 (2007).
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great debate and beyond the scope of this Article, the doctrine of necessity is
directly affected by deterrence.
Although there are several theories of how to determine whether a cyber
attack has occurred, the most prominent theory involves looking at the results
of the attack.116 Generally, if the threshold of attack is crossed, the doctrine of
necessity acts to limit the scope of the response in self-defense by the victim
state to that amount of force necessary to counter the threat.117 In other words,
when a victim state is justifying its response to the armed attack, the victim
state must demonstrate why the response is necessary and that stopping the
attack cannot be accomplished by lesser means.118
The theories of deterrence discussed below could actually remove the
ability of a victim state to justify a response because they would remove the
necessity to respond. For example, one theory of deterrence is for a nation to
have such redundancy in its systems that an attack, which might otherwise
have significant effects on the targeted system, would not have the intended
effects.119 Because there would be no actual impact, there would also be no
necessity for the victim to respond in order to restore operations.
As a matter of law, the victim nation could not justify a response as
necessary if nothing resulted from the attack.120 Even if deterrence were only
able to mitigate the attack, the doctrines of necessity and proportionality121
would restrict the legal responses available to the victim. This is certainly not a
justification to forego deterrence, but it is a significant issue that must be
accounted for by a nation in its various approaches to deterring adversaries.
***
116 See Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello, 84 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 365, 373–75, 378 (2002); Paul A. Walker, Rethinking Computer Network ‘Attack’: Implications
for Law and U.S. Doctrine, 1 NAT’L SECURITY L. BR., no. 1, 2011, at 33, 45–47.
117 Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus Ad Bellum Override Jus In Bello? Reaffirming the Separation of the Two
Bodies of Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 963, 973–74 (2008).
118 See id.
119 See Taipale, supra note 5, at 36.
120 See id. at 35.
121 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 51, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol
I]; see also DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 41, app. A at
v (Supp. 1976); Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law:
Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 804–05, 2010. But see James Adams, Virtual
Defense, 80 FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2001, at 98, 110 (arguing that it is unclear how the law of
proportionality applies to information warfare).
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Despite these important issues, applying deterrence through and against
cyber operations is vital to national security. Accounting for the assumptions
and working through the issues will be a necessary hazard for nations, but the
benefits of applying a full-spectrum cyber deterrent will be worth the trouble.
II. CYBER DETERRENCE
122

The Internet was not designed with the goal of deterrence in mind.

Cyber deterrence can and should be an active part of national security
strategy. Because of their unique nature, cyber operations provide an expanded
view of cyber deterrence, one that includes many of the historical notions of
deterrence but which may only slightly resemble the deterrence efforts of the
Cold War. This Part will be divided into two broad categories of cyber
deterrence: A) Retaliation and B) Denying the benefit of the attack. Within
these two categories, the Article will define and analyze six approaches to
cyber deterrence and their attending legal issues.123
A. Retaliation
The threat of retaliation, when coupled with the present capability and
apparent will to do so, can be a great deterrent to many potential actors.124
Such a strategy was the foundation of U.S. deterrence policy during the Cold
War125 and continues to be a significant aspect of current U.S. deterrence
policy.126 Not all potential foes will be completely deterred by the threat of a
response, but because many may, it is a vital aspect of deterrence. This is also
true of cyber deterrence. Two specific aspects of retaliation deserve study here.
First, retaliation to a cyber incident may come in the form of striking back at

122 David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling Attribution, in PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON
DETERRING CYBERATTACKS 25, 25 (Comm. on Deterring Cyberattacks, Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l
Acads. eds., 2010).
123 See Geers, supra note 28, at 299 (dividing cyber attack deterrence strategies into two categories: denial
and punishment. Each category has three basic requirements: 1) capability; 2) communication; and 3)
credibility). But see Taipale, supra note 5, at 4 (dividing his discussion of cyber deterrence into the following
categories: 1) penalty; 2) futility; 3) dependency; and 4) counter-productivity).
124 Taipale, supra note 5, at 44.
125 Kugler, supra note 31 at 321–24; Willie Curtis, National Missile Defense: A Retreat from Dr.
Strangelove or How I Learn to Stop Worrying and Love MAD, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 795, 797 (2002).
126 See NEW DETERRENT WORKING GROUP, US NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: GETTING
IT RIGHT 38–39 (2009).
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the perpetrator, to include the use of force.127 Such a response is lawful in
many cases, though there are attending legal issues.128 Second, retaliation can
also be based on a law enforcement paradigm and be characterized by potential
legal actions, such as criminal or civil liabilities and penalties. These two
means of deterrence will be discussed next.
1. Strike Back
The ability to strike an adversary in response to an attack that is imminent
or has already commenced was the backbone of nuclear deterrence. Often
referred to as Mutually Assured Destruction,129 this doctrine in its most basic
form relied on the threat of such a devastating attack against an opponent’s
complete civilization that there was no need to exercise defense.130 In other
words, the threat of such a devastating response can alter the cost-benefit
analysis and convince others not to attack.
a. Response to a Cyber Attack
In response to a cyber attack, a state can consider, plan on, and signal the
full spectrum of responses.131 Promised kinetic response, even nuclear
response, remains an option as a deterrent to cyber warfare. The potential for
responses based on misunderstandings has prompted the United States to
engage with both Russia and China concerning the establishment of a cyber
version of the nuclear “hotline,” where one country could forewarn the other of
either unintended acts or intended acts that were not meant as aggressive.132
Similarly, the recent National Security Strategy for Cyberspace stated that:
When warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in
cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country . . . . We
reserve the right to use all necessary means—diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic—as appropriate and consistent
127 Jeremy A. Rabkin & Ariel Rabkin, To Confront Cyber Threats, We Must Rethink the Law of Armed
Conflict, HOOVER INSTITUTION, 1, 3 (2012), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Emerging
Threats_Rabkin.pdf.
128 Id.
129 RUMBLE, supra note 19, at 42, 71 (explaining mutually assured destruction in nuclear deterrence).
130 Henry S. Rowen, Introduction to GETTING MAD: NUCLEAR MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION, ITS
ORIGINS AND PRACTICE 1, 3 (Henry D. Sokolski ed., 2004).
131 But see Tang & Zhang, supra note 12, at 1 (arguing that retaliation is ineffective in the cyber realm).
132 See Ellen Nakashima, U.S., Russia May Use Alert System for Cybersecurity, WASH. POST, April 27,
2012, at A1; see also Adam Segal, U.S., China Butt Cyber Heads, DIPLOMAT (June 19, 2012), http://
thediplomat.com/china-power/u-s-china-butt-cyber-heads.
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with applicable international law, in order to defend our Nation, our
allies, our partners, and our interests. In so doing, we will exhaust all
options before military force whenever we can; will carefully weigh
the costs and risks of action against the costs of inaction; and will act
in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy,
133
seeking broad international support whenever possible.

While this statement was controversial when made,134 there is no doubt of its
legality.135 Neither international law nor the law of armed conflict requires a
response in kind, as long as the response is proportional, as will be discussed
below.
The idea of using a kinetic response to a cyber attack is not new and has
been discussed in the literature.136 It seems clear that while most commentators
agree in principle, they acknowledge that responding kinetically to a cyber
attack raises a number of valid concerns. With the difficulties of attribution
discussed above and the ability to spoof the identity of the attacker, a kinetic
response carries with it some risks.137 Besides the attribution issue, a kinetic
133 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE 2 (2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/internationalstrategy_cyberspace.pdf; see also Kevin
Chilton & Greg Weaver, Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Spring 2009,
at 31, 39.
134 Tom Gjelten, Pentagon Strategy Prepares For War in Cyberspace, NPR (July 15, 2011), http://
www.npr.org/2011/07/15/137928048/u-s-military-unveils-cyberspace-strategy. Additionally, the author
attended an international cyber conference in Singapore shortly after the announcement was made and was
literally accosted by representatives of other governments for greater explanation of this policy statement.
135 See infra Part II.A.1.b; cf. Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 841 (arguing that states may respond with
armed force to a cyber attack pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter if the effects of the attack
are equivalent to those of a conventional armed attack); Adam Segal, Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 2,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 14, 2011), http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Policy_
Innovation_Memo2_Segal.pdf (arguing that most countries would accept that cyber attacks with “kinetic
effects” could be met with kinetic responses). But see Jack Goldsmith, General Cartwright on Offensive Cyber
Weapons and Deterrence, LAWFARE (Nov. 28, 2011, 10:27 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/11/
general-cartwright-on-offensive-cyber-weapons-and-deterrence (arguing that although armed responses to
cyber attacks may be legal, they are unlikely to occur).
136 See, e.g., Huntley, supra note 70, at 39 (explaining that cyber attacks that cause physical damage,
injury, or death may be met with a kinetic response); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the
Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885,
594 (1999) (laying out principles dictating when a kinetic response to a cyber attack may be appropriate);
Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 569, 575–77, 594
(2011) (arguing that if no other recourse exists to thwart a cyber attack amounting to an armed attack, kinetic
options are permissible under the law of self-defense); Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of
Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 426–40 (2011) (summarizing the debate
over how cyber attacks fit into the armed attack paradigm, if at all).
137 See Joyner & Lotrionte, supra note 62, at 856; see also DEP’T OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 21 (1999), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/
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response may simply not be fast enough to act as a deterrent before the damage
is done.138 Further, a kinetic response may provoke the victim or lead to an
escalation.139 These limitations on the value of strike back as a deterrent do not
prevent its usefulness but act to encourage states to not rely on one single
theory of deterrence.
Additionally, nothing would preclude using cyber means to strike back at
an attacker, and this is certainly an assumed possibility. Cyber responses to a
cyber attack might be the most effective in some situations.140 General
Alexander recently testified before Congress, “I can assure you that, in
appropriate circumstances and on order from the National Command
Authority, we can back up [DoD’s] assertion that any actor contemplating a
crippling cyber attack against the United States would be taking a grave
risk.”141 The key point is that, as a matter of signaling deterrence, strike back is
not limited to cyber operations and could include the full spectrum of kinetic
responses as well.
b. Legal Issues
The legal issues with preparing and signaling a kinetic strike in response to
cyber warfare include all the legal issues of a kinetic strike in response to a
similar kinetic strike.142 Because these issues are not unique to cyber conflict,
they deserve little attention here except to make three important points
concerning “armed attack,” necessity and proportional response.
i. Armed Attack
The Charter of the United Nations is the paradigm that governs the use of
force by states as well as the legality of a forceful response in self-defense.143

awc/awcgate/dod-io-legal/dod-io-legal.pdf; Marco Roscini, World Wide Warfare—Jus Ad Bellum and the Use
of Cyber Force, 14 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 85, 96 (2010) (Ger.); Goldsmith, supra note 134.
138 Joyner & Lotrionte, supra note 62, at 856.
139 See id.
140 For example, a country may wish to send a “shot across the bow” of a cyber attacker by disabling
some, but not all, of the attacker’s computer systems. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEFENSE, AN
ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 20 (1999).
141 Budget Request for Information Technology and Cyber Operations Programs, supra note 17, at 3
(statement of General Keith B. Alexander, Commander, United States Cyber Command).
142 See Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a
Normative Framework, supra note 136, at 913. See generally id. at 910–23 (discussing appropriate state
responses to varying levels of cyber attack).
143 Waxman, supra note 136, at 426–27.
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Again, it is not necessary to fully explain the paradigm here, but it is necessary
to address the issue of “use of force” and “armed attack,” two of the key terms
in the Charter paradigm. The Charter categorically prohibits “the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence” of a state.144
Accordingly, any cyber action that amounts to a use of force is illegal.145
However, the Charter does not allow a victim of a cyber attack that amounts to
a “use of force” to respond in self-defense.146 Such responses are limited to
activities that equate to an armed attack,147 a standard clearly indicating a
greater quantum of force than a “use of force.”148
A state’s ability to lawfully signal a “strike back” deterrent to cyber attacks
would be subject to a determination that a cyber attack not only rose to the
level of a use of force, but also an armed attack.149 While conceivable as a
theoretical matter, there has yet to be a reported cyber attack between states
that has been acknowledged as even a use of force, let alone an armed
attack.150 The recent Stuxnet attack against Iranian nuclear capabilities,151 if
found to have been sponsored by a state, is likely the closest the international
community has come to such an event.152
Some have argued that particular targets that are especially susceptible to
cyber attack, such as certain critical infrastructure, might not require a
traditional armed attack to allow a proportional self-defense response.153

144

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
Roscini, supra note 137, at 113.
146 See Waxman, supra note 136, at 434–35.
147 U.N. Charter art. 51.
148 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
14, paras. 191, 210 (June 27) (“[M]easures which do not constitute an armed attack . . . may nevertheless
involve a use of force.”); Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 788, 790 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002); Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum
Revisited, supra note 136, at 587 (“Simply put, all armed attacks are uses of force, but not all uses of force
qualify as armed attacks.”); Waxman, supra note 136, at 427.
149 Roscini, supra note 137, at 113.
150 Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 840.
151 Peter Beaumont, Cyberwar on Iran More Widespread Than First Thought, Researchers Say,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/sep/21/cyberwar-iran-moresophisticated.
152 Gary D. Brown, Why Iran Didn’t Admit Stuxnet Was an Attack, JOINT FORCES Q., 4th Quarter 2011, at
70, 71.
153 Sean Condron, Getting it Right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 403, 415–16 (2007); see Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National
Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 221–29 (2002).
145
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President Obama’s May 2009 statement154 seems to provide some support for
this idea. However, the current state of international law makes no such
allowance.155 Therefore, the requirement that a cyber attack amount to an
armed attack remains applicable as the necessary legal trigger before a state
can respond in self-defense.156
In 1999, the DoD’s Office of General Counsel issued its Assessment of
Legal Issues in Information Operations,157 which gave an example of a
potential cyber armed attack. The Assessment states:
[I]f a coordinated computer network attack shuts down a nation’s air
traffic control system along with its banking and financial systems
and public utilities, and opens the floodgates of several dams
resulting in general flooding that causes widespread civilian deaths
and property damage, it may well be that no one would challenge the
victim nation if it concluded that it was a victim of an armed attack,
158
or of an act equivalent to an armed attack.

The fact that the Assessment lists all of these potential harms in the
conjunctive limits its usefulness as a good barometer for what cyber operations
would actually rise to the level of an armed attack. However, it at least
provides a starting point from which to work.
The limitation in the UN Charter on using self-defense to an armed attack
does not mean that a state must sit idly while being harmed from cyber
operations. As early as 1986, in a case concerning U.S. military activities in
Honduras in response to an insurgency aided by Nicaragua,159 the International
Court of Justice stated that proportionate countermeasures would be
permissible in response to a use of force that did not amount to an armed

154

Compare Obama, supra note 17 (digital infrastructure should be treated as a “strategic national asset”
and attacks against it “deter[red], prevent[ed], detect[ed], and defend[ed] against . . . .”), with INTERNATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 133, at 14 (the United States reserves the right to use “all necessary
means—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic,” to defend itself against “hostile acts in
cyberspace.”).
155 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. 14, para. 195 (June 27) (limiting the lawful use self-defensive force to when the state concerned has been
the victim of an armed attack).
156 A state would still be able to respond with appropriate countermeasures. See Katharine C. Hinkle,
Countermeasures in the Cyber Context: One More Thing to Worry About, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 11, 12,
16, 19 (2011), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-37-hinkle-countermeasures-in-the-cyber-context.pdf.
157 OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 140, at 18.
158 Id.
159 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, paras. 1, 15, 20.
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attack.160 The Court laid out a three-part test for the use of countermeasures in
a subsequent case:161
First, the action must be taken in response to a previous international
wrongful act of another state, and it must be directed against that
state. Second, the injured state must have called upon the offending
state to discontinue its wrongful conduct or to make reparation for it.
Third, the countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury
162
suffered, taking into account the rights in question.

While this is an unsatisfactory situation, particularly in response to cyber
operations against critical national infrastructure,163 it appears to be the status
of the law, as illustrated by the recent International Law Commission’s “Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts . . . .”164
Article 49 allows a state to use countermeasures “against a State which is
responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to
comply with its obligations.”165 This wrongful act would be something short of
an armed attack, thereby not allowing the victim state to respond in selfdefense, but only with proportional countermeasures.
A detailed discussion of countermeasures deserves greater attention than
can be given here, but it is important to note that countermeasures may be
forceful166 and can be forceful enough to induce compliance with international
law.167 In terms of cyber operations, that would mean that the appropriate
countermeasure could include a kinetic or cyber option that would not be an
illegal use of force,168 but would be strong enough to convince the attacker to
cease the cyber operations.

160

Id. para. 249.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, paras. 83–85 (Sept. 25).
162 Jensen, supra note 153, at 220.
163 See id. at 221, 229.
164 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess.,
at 128–29, Supp. No. 10, art. 22, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm. 26,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/2001/Add.1.
165 See id. at 129.
166 See id. at 128.
167 See id.
168 See id.
161
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ii. Necessity
The doctrine of necessity is adequately discussed above.169 It is mentioned
here again merely to demonstrate that this is a good example of how deterrence
may remove the doctrine of necessity. It would be unlawful for a state to signal
a potential kinetic or cyber anticipatory defensive action to even an armed
attack, if that state’s defenses were sufficient to completely nullify any damage
from an impending attack.170 If the victim state knew that an impending attack
was going to be futile or completely ineffective, it would not have the
necessity to act in anticipation of that attack.171
iii. Proportionality
Though international law does not require a response in kind to an attack,
any response in self-defense is limited not only by the principle of necessity,
but also by the principle of proportionality. Any planned or signaled response
intended as a deterrent would have to be proportional to the threat or use of
force anticipated.172 Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn has stated, “[w]e have
to have a system that recognizes an attack, registers it and then allows us to
react in a way that’s appropriate and proportional.”173 As discussed above, this
would not require a response in kind, but any response would have to meet this
legal criterion.174 Uniquely, cyber attacks may expand the spectrum of
proportional responses available to a state.175 Such responses could be done
alone or in conjunction with kinetic responses, so long as the complete
response still met the proportional response requirement.
The use of the term “proportional” does not mean that the response must be
the same as the attack or equal in method.176 Rather it means that the response
must be comparable to the initial wrong and not equate to an escalation.177
Some have argued that determining a proportionate response to a cyber
169

See supra Part I.B.4.
See supra Part I.B.4.
171 See supra Part I.B.4.
172 See Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 840 n.84, 849.
173 Jared Serbu, DoD Cyber Strategy Aims at Deterrence, FED. NEWS RADIO (July 15, 2011), http://www.
federalnewsradio.com/697/2457989/DoD-cyber-strategy-aims-at-deterrence.
174 See supra Part II.A.1.a.
175 See Sean Kanuck, Sovereign Discourse on Cyber Conflict Under International Law, 88 TEX. L. REV.
1571, 1595 (2010); Brian T. O’Donnell & James C. Kraska, Humanitarian Law: Developing International
Rules for the Digital Battlefield, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 133, 160 (2003).
176 See supra Part II.A.1.a.
177 Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 849.
170
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operation may prove difficult.178 The legal standard by which a response is
judged is whether it is no more than what is required to end the situation and
successfully defend the victim.179 Because cyber operations offer such a broad
spectrum of potential activities, it may be that cyber responses actually will
prove to be very useful in crafting a proportionate response to any attack,
including a cyber attack.
While much more could be said on this specific aspect of cyber
deterrence,180 it is sufficient here to note that the cyber deterrence issues are
not significantly different than kinetic deterrence issues, other than the specific
aspects mentioned. The possibility of cyber deterrence through a strike back by
either kinetic or cyber means should be an effective means of deterrence, at
least to certain actors.
2. Legal Strike Back
As opposed to the Subpart above where the strike back contemplated is
likely to have some destructive effect, this Subpart contemplates deterrence
through the traditional law enforcement paradigm. In other words, this type of
deterrence might be characterized as “I will find you after your attack and
make you pay, either criminally, or civilly, or both.” In discussing the need for
other deterrence methodologies, Kim Taipale has written:
[B]ecause of the particular characteristics of cyberspace—in
particular because of its dual use and borderless nature; the difficulty
of differentiating probe from attack and definitively identifying
attackers; the zero time interval between detection and attack and the
scale-free, unpredictable and unbounded nature of potential
consequences; the multiplicity of potential attack vectors, attackers,
and motivations; and the contestability of potential responses—a
general retaliatory-based policy that explicitly threatens severe
punishment in response to a particular kind of attack may not be

178 Cf. LIBICKI, supra note 22, at 41–52 (giving an in depth discussion of the difficulties surrounding
cyber attribution).
179 See Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited, supra note 136, at 582.
180 See generally Huntley, supra note 70 (discussing the connection between jus ad bellum principles and
cyber attacks); Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law, supra note 135
(suggesting a normative framework in which to conceptualize cyber attacks); Schmitt, Cyber Operations and
the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited, supra note 135 (explaining fault lines in international law on the use of force and
the effect of this disagreements on the status of cyber attacks); Waxman, supra note 136 (investigating the
relationship between strategy and legal definitions of force).
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sufficient to deter cyber attacks, and, in some circumstances, may be
181
counterproductive.

As Duncan Hollis has recently written, “[c]ybercrime rules rest on the theory
that if states identify and prosecute enough hackers, hactivists, and criminal
organizations for cyber threats, other individuals will refrain from engaging in
that conduct.”182 This same view is reflected by General Alexander who stated
“[t]he bottom line is, the only way to deter cyber attack is to work to catch
perpetrators and take strong and public action when we do.”183
a. Prosecution
State practice in response to a cyber incident has almost universally relied
on the criminal law paradigm.184 This has even been true when the cyber
operations were conducted against government computers. For example, the
2006 cyber attacks against government and civilian computer systems in
Estonia that many initially thought were sponsored by the Russian government
were eventually pursued using the criminal law paradigm.185 The existence of
an ongoing armed conflict does not seem to change this approach.186
Therefore, if for no other reason than current state practice, legal strike back
has become a significant response to cyber attack and must be considered as
part of a nation’s cyber deterrence strategy.187
Legal strike back in the form of prosecutions can undoubtedly play an
important role in both general and specific deterrence. Past prosecutions signal
the willingness to use the punishment and add credibility to the deterrence

181

Taipale, supra note 5, at 3–4.
Hollis, supra note 6, at 395.
183 Id. at 396.
184 See, e.g., Adams, supra note 120, at 107; Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 863; Neal Kumar Katyal,
Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1004–05 (2001); Gilbert C. Sosa, Country Report on
Cybercrime: The Philippines, 79 U.N. ASIA & FAR E. INST. 81–82 (2001).
185 ENEKEN TIKK & KADRI KASKA, Legal Cooperation to Investigate Cyber Incidents: Estonian Case
Study and Lessons, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION WARFARE AND
SECURITY, 288, 288–89 (Josef Demergis ed., 2010); Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War:
Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 192, 208 (2009).
186 See Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of Force, 34 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 57, 68 (2001); Kevin Poulsen, Solar Sunrise Hacker ‘Analyzer’ Escapes Jail, REGISTER (June
15, 2001), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/06/15/solar_sunrise_hacker_analyzer_escapes.
187 Raduege, supra note 71, at 5 (“Working together, we need concerted efforts to appropriately punish
criminal [cyber] activity, which will aid in deterrence in countering syndicated global criminal activity.”).
182
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methodology.188 Public arrests and prosecutions allow states to argue that if
someone hacks into their systems, the day of reckoning will eventually arrive
and the hacker will pay a costly price in either jail time, money damages, or
both.189 Many nations are increasing their cyber forensics capabilities190 and
enacting domestic laws that increase both coverage and penalties for cyber
crimes.191
International cooperation is equally important.192 The ability to demonstrate
that those who have engaged in these activities across transnational borders
have been brought to justice through cooperation of nations should serve to
deter would-be attackers. The Cybercrime Convention193 and its mostly
procedural provisions194 increase the likelihood of someone from one of the
signatory countries being prosecuted for cyber crime in one of the other
signatory countries.195 As these types of prosecutions occur more often, they
will have a greater deterrent effect.
In addition to the Cybercrime Convention, a continuing web of bilateral
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (“MLATs”)196 allow for a much streamlined
process for seeking help when one nation is the victim of a cyber incident that
originates or travels through another nation.197 The U.S. Department of Justice

188

U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Six Hackers in the United States and Abroad Charged for
Crimes Affecting Over One Million Victims, FBI (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/
2012/six-hackers-in-the-united-states-and-abroad-charged-for-crimes-affecting-over-one-million-victims;
Mary Slosson, Accused LulzSec Hacker Pleads Guilty in Sony Breach, REUTERS (April 5, 2012), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/us-hacking-lulzsec-sony-idUSBRE8340YR20120405.
189 U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 188; Slosson, supra note 187.
190 Aaron Edwards, Manhattan Prosecutor to Centralize Efforts Against Cybercrime, N.Y. TIMES: CITY
ROOM BLOG (Aug. 14, 2012, 4:14 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/14/manhattan-prosecutorto-centralize-efforts-against-cybercrime.
191 For example, India has recently passed a number of new laws strengthening its position on cyber
criminality. Pavan Duggal, The View from India: Cyber Deterrence: Legal Perspectives, in GLOBAL CYBER
DETERRENCE, supra note 12, at 8, 9.
192 See Tang & Zhang, supra note 12, at 2 (arguing that “only international cooperation will enable us to
better crack down on cyber crime and ensure the healthy development of the Internet.”).
193 See Convention on Cybercrime art. 23, opened for signature Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185 (entered
into force July 1, 2004).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 See generally Robert Neale Lyman, Compulsory Process in a Globalized Era: Defendant Access to
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, 47 VA. J. INT’L. L. 261 (2006) (explaining how Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties streamline the evidence-gathering process).
197 Id. at 276.
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is actively engaged in both seeking and using MLATs as it fights cyber crime
across international borders.198
This means of deterrence (and punishment, for that matter) is the means on
which most nations currently rely. It has arguably proven very effective in
many cases. However, the legal strike back option, including when facilitated
by the Cybercrime Convention or MLATs, still suffers from a number of
significant legal issues.
b. Legal Issues
Legal issues in legal strike back deterrence include transnational and
international procedural problems, such as extradition and jurisdiction, as well
as the inability for the law to reach certain actors who operate from
ungoverned territory. Additionally, the paucity of effective international
agreements to solve these problems limits the ability for a nation to signal legal
strike back as a realistic deterrent.
The limited success of the Cybercrime Convention highlights the need for
greater cooperation in this area. Currently, there are only thirty-three parties to
the Convention, and many of the most notorious hacking nations are not
among them.199 The otherwise effective measures based on the Convention are
much less meaningful as a deterrent when so few countries are parties.
Additionally, there are legal issues with the use of MLATs. In most cases,
MLATs are subject to domestic implementation and are traditionally not a
timely way to gather information or seek timely judicial assistance.200
Countries often take many months to respond to an MLAT request.201 The
deterrent effect of prosecution likely is minimized when the trial occurs many
years after the event.
There may also be limitations on the exchange of information in support of
the Cybercrime Convention, an MLAT, or some other request to support
prosecution. Some statutory preclusions to sharing of information exist, such
198 EU: JHA Council Authorises Signing of EU–USA Agreements on Extradition and Mutual Legal
Assistance, STATEWATCH (June 1, 2003), http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/jun/01useu.htm.
199 Convention on Cybercrime, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/Commun/print/Cherchesig.asp?NT=185&CM=*&DF=&CL=ENG.
200 Parth Shastri, Cyber Police Dreads Crimes that Crosses National Boundaries, TIMES OF INDIA (July
23, 2012), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-07-23/ahmedabad/32803348_1_cyber-crimes-datatheft-data-security-council.
201 Id.
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as the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act,202 which prevents the
“transfer of classified national security information and law enforcement
information to the International Criminal Court for the purpose of facilitating
an investigation, apprehension, or prosecution.”203
One of the results of an MLAT or of the cooperative work through the
Cybercrime Convention might be a request for extradition of the hacker to
stand trial in the country where the damage occurred. Extradition is normally
based on the principle of dual criminality, which requires that any conduct for
which a victim nation is seeking extradition is criminalized in both
countries.204 Where domestic cyber legislation is still in its infancy in many
nations across the world, a perpetrator might not be subject to extradition,
despite the clarity of the evidence.205
The shortcomings of extradition demonstrate a clear need for greater
harmonization of domestic laws among nations. Many groups are advocating
such actions,206 and some progress is being made,207 but there is a long way to
go. Until domestic cyber laws and procedure are harmonized to provide greater
similarity in cyber crimes across national systems, effective deterrence through
a legal strike back theory will be diminished.
In addition to the harmonization of domestic laws, effective deterrence for
cyber malfeasance also depends on general recognition of transnational
theories of jurisdiction to include the protective principle and passive
personality theory.208 Both have recently been used in terrorism cases209 and
would presumably be equally acceptable in cases of cyber operations, though
there is little state practice currently in the area. For legal strike back to really
deter potential actors, it is likely that these actors would have to expect that the

202 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421–7433 (2006) (enacted as part of the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States).
203 Id. § 7425(a).
204 See Jonathan O. Hafen, International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the Dual Criminality
Requirement, 1992 BYU L. REV. 191, 191.
205 Scot M. Graydon, Jurisdiction Issues in Cybercrime, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 99, 101 (2005).
206 Duggal, supra note 191, at 10; see, e.g., Sharon R. Stevens, Internet War Crimes Tribunals and
Security in an Interconnected World, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 657, 685–86 (2009).
207 See, e.g., Fair Trials International Submits Plan for Extradition Reform, BELTRAMI & CO. CRIM. L. &
GLASGOW SOLIC. BLOG (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.beltramiandcompany.co.uk/Latest-News/Entry/humanrights/fair-trials-international-submits-plan-for-extradition-reform.html.
208 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987).
209 See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 96–97 (2d Cir. 2003).
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victim country would be able to effectively assert jurisdiction in its domestic
courts.
Even if domestic laws were harmonized, formal dual criminality in
extradition resolved, and principles of jurisdiction fully accepted, there are still
areas in the world where legal strike back would provide little deterrence
because of the limited reach of the law. These areas include failed (or failing)
states and states where the computer operators were acting with the complicity
of the government.
The problem with failed or failing states is that the ability to deter by threat
of recourse to the law is only effective in areas where the law can reach. Just as
terrorism210 and piracy211 tend to flourish in ungoverned or poorly governed
areas, cyber actors often seek refuge in areas that are beyond the legal reach of
their victims.212 When an area lacks domestic enforcement capabilities that can
respond to international or transnational procedure, the deterrent effect of legal
strike back is severely diminished.
A similar legal issue occurs when a government lacks the will to respond to
international and transnational procedure following a malicious cyber
operation.213 This scenario may demonstrate itself most often when the state is
complicit in the attacks. An example cited for this situation is the attacks on
Estonia by Russian hacktivists. Despite no direct link to the Russian
government, many experts still believe that the Russians facilitated the cyber
attacks. 214 Once it was determined that the attacks originated from Russian
hacktivists, Estonia submitted requests to Russia for assistance in tracking the
perpetrators.215 Russia responded by refusing to provide information to Estonia
under their MLAT.216 Of course, if Russia was complicit in orchestrating the
210 ANGEL RABASA ET AL., UNGOVERNED TERRITORIES: UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCING TERRORISM
RISKS 111 (2007).
211 See id.
212 Id. at 15–21.
213 See generally Shackelford, supra note 185, at 208 (noting how Russia refused to cooperate with an
Estonian investigation into an alleged cyber attack committed by the Russian Government despite MLATs
between the two countries).
214 Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia, GUARDIAN (May, 16, 2007),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia; see also Collin Allan, Control Issues in
Cyberspace 8–9 (Apr. 5, 2012) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (demonstrating Russian
government complicity in later attacks by Russian hacktivists on Georgia).
215 See Shackelford, supra note 185, at 208.
216 Id.; see also TIKK & KASKA, supra note 185, at 289 (“In its answer to the European Commission’s
inquiry on that subject, the Ministry of Justice pointed out the following issues with Russia regarding
cooperation in criminal matters: 1) Revision of a letter rogatory generally takes much time and reminders are
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attacks, they will be hesitant to either prosecute the hacktivists or even provide
information concerning the operation.
This example shows the legal difficulties generated by complicit states and,
on the broader front, the problems with legal strike back as a means of
deterrence. In international and transnational systems where so much is based
on inter-state cooperation, legal strike back can only be an effective means of
deterrence when states work together with the common goal of suppressing
malicious cyber activity. Many commentators and states have urged new
international agreements to promote cooperation,217 but as community
agreement of how to effectuate that goal is unlikely to coalesce any time soon,
legal strike back can be effective only in limited circumstances as a deterrent
and must be supplemented by additional methodologies to ensure national
security.
B. Denying the Benefit of the Attack
The success of the previous two methodologies for deterrence relies on fear
of some form of retaliation, either because a potential victim appears capable
and willing to retaliate or because a potential victim has previously retaliated
after prior attacks. The threats or historical examples of retaliation are designed
to discourage future attackers.218 However, this is not the only way to view
deterrence. Deterrence can also be accomplished by denying an adversary the
benefit of an attack.219 As was recently stated by then-Deputy Secretary of
Defense William Lynn:
Our strategy’s overriding emphasis is on denying the benefit of an
attack. Rather than rely on the threat of retaliation alone to deter
attacks in cyberspace, we aim to change an adversaries’ [sic]
incentives in a more fundamental way. If an attack will not have its

ignored; 2) Assistance is refused for procedural activities regarding suspects; this is justified by referring to the
fact that the notion of ‘suspect’ does not exist in Russian legislation; also, Russia will not interrogate a person
of Russian citizenship; 3) A prior court ruling is required as a precondition for transferring of documents; 4)
Covert investigation is refused without a court order (in Estonia, the relevant authorisation is issued by the
Public Prosecutor’s Office); 5) On occasions, Russia has insisted that a particular request be submitted through
Interpol—this was also the case in relation to the letter rogatory concerning the April/May 2007 cyber
attacks.”).
217 Grigoriev, supra note 44, at 7; Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 11; Stein Schjolberg, The View from
Norway: Wanted: A United Nations Cyberspace Treaty, in GLOBAL CYBER DETERRENCE, supra note 12, at 11.
218 See, e.g., Kugler, supra note 31, at 324.
219 Id. at 327.
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intended effect, those who wish us harm will have less reason to
220
target us through cyberspace in the first place.

Lynn’s comment is especially important to an understanding of why cyber
deterrence is different from other kinetic deterrence strategies, which rely so
heavily on retaliation. Though all deterrence paradigms rely in some way on
the idea of denying an adversary the benefit of the attack,221 cyber operations
allow this aspect of deterrence to become the primary approach. Through
making cyber systems invulnerable to cyber attack, building resiliency into
cyber systems, making certain systems invisible to attackers, and making
networks so interdependent that some potential attackers would also hurt
themselves in an attack, a state can deny the anticipated benefits to would-be
attackers. Each of these ideas will be analyzed separately below.
One caveat to this theory of cyber deterrence: it creates a balancing
between the costs of the attack and the perceived likelihood of success.222 In
other words, for some attackers where the perceived costs of the attack are near
zero, even a very small chance of success compared to their cost of actual
attack will almost always lead to attack. Therefore, complete deterrence would
require an attacker to perceive no chance of success. Getting to a zero chance
of success may simply not be possible, but the closer nations come to
developing systems with a perfect or near-perfect level of security, the more
likely potential attackers may be deterred.
1. Invulnerability
In the broadest terms, this deterrent methodology may be simplified as
“even if you try, you can’t get me.”223 This is much like the Strategic Defense
Initiative (“SDI”)224 in nuclear policy, which purported to create a “shield
between the U.S. and its enemies . . . that could intercept and destroy attacking
ballistic missiles in mid-flight.”225 This proposed form of deterrence would
220 Lynn, supra note 56 (stating, in addition, that “[a]n important element of our strategy is therefore
focused on denying or at least minimizing the benefit of an attack.”); Serbu, supra note 173.
221 See Kugler, supra note 31, at 324, 327.
222 Id. at 327.
223 See supra Part I.B.4 (discussing the potential effects of this capability on the doctrine of necessity in
relation to taking anticipatory actions prior to a computer attack).
224 President’s Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1983, at A20; see
also DEP’T OF DEF., INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE ON THE PRESIDENT’S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 1
(1984), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a344624.pdf.
225 John E. Parkinson, Jr., International Legal Implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative, 116 MIL. L.
REV. 67, 70 (1987). A modern version of this might be the “Iron Dome” system that Israel uses against rockets
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have allowed the holder to say to its enemies “fire all the nuclear weapons you
want, but I can shoot them all down before they hurt me.”226 In retrospect, SDI
may not have been scientifically possible at the time,227 but it was instrumental
in the downfall of the Soviet Union, as they expended time, energy, and
resources to try and overcome such a great defense.228 A similar ability to
secure U.S. cyber networks and assets would significantly deter would-be
attackers because of the futility of the attack.
a. Protecting the Systems
The ubiquity of cyber systems makes the task of protecting them extremely
difficult. In an era of nuclear attack, SDI was designed to prevent missiles fired
from the ground or launched from the sea from crossing into U.S. airspace.229
While the targets could be very diverse, they were contained in a geographical
limit and were discernible shortly after the attacks were launched.230 Further,
once an attack would have been initiated, it would have been clear that the
victim state was under attack and the effects would have been generally

fired from the West Bank. See Iron Dome Defense System Against Short Range Artillery Rockets, RAFAEL
ADVANCED DEF. SYS. LTD., http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/6/946.pdf.
226 While it would have been a very effective defense, the deterrent nature of the threat of producing
Strategic Defense Initiative (“SDI”) was very destabilizing. Stephen J. Cimbala, The Strategic Defense
Initiative: Political Risks, AIR U. REV. (Nov.–Dec. 1985), http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/
aureview/1985/nov-dec/cimbala.html; Parkinson, supra note 224, at 150–51; Eric A. Posner, Distinguished
Scholar Series: International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 797, 821 (2005). In the
context of potential state-on-state cyber warfare, the ability to produce SDI-like security on computer systems
would likely be less destabilizing but should be considered.
227 Michael A. McCann, National Missile Defense: Legal & Policy Justifications for Expanding
Deterrence & Preventing War in the 21st Century, 3 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 207, 227–28 (2002); Robert A.
Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 23–24 n.97
(2000); David Sulek & Ned Moran, What Analogies Can Tell Us About the Future of Cybersecurity, 6–7 (June
18, 2009) (working paper, CCDCOE Conference on Cyber Warfare), http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/
virtualbattlefield/08_SULEK_What%20Cyber%20Analogies%20Can%20Tell%20Us.pdf.
228 Joseph Patterson Hyder, Cold War (1972–1989): the Collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ESPIONAGE, INTELLIGENCE, AND SECURITY 238, 240 (K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Wilmoth
Lerner eds., 2004); Warren E. Norquist, How the United States Won the Cold War, INTELLIGENCER: J. OF U.S.
INTELLIGENCE STUD., Winter/Spring 2003, at 47, 51, 53, 55; Kathryn Stoner-Weiss & Michael McFaul,
Domestic and International Influences on the Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) and Russia’s Initial
Transition to Democracy (1993) 17–19 (Stanford Univ. Ctr. on Democracy, Dev., & the Rule of Law,
Working Paper No. 108, 2009); Eric S. O’Malley, Destabilization Policy: Lessons from Reagan on
International Law, Revolutions and Dealing with Pariah Nations, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 319, 355 (2003).
229 See Stoner-Weiss & McFaul, supra note 228, at 17.
230 Cf. McCann, supra note 227, at 232–33 (discussing the ability of the U.S. military to analyze an enemy
attack and intercept the enemy missile to prevent it from reaching its target).
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predictable.231 Attacking an adversary with an intercontinental ballistic missile
would have been nearly impossible to do without the victim knowing it was
under attack.
These aspects of nuclear attack are simply not the case with cyber attack.
Adversaries’ attack systems almost constantly change and it is almost never
immediately discernible where the attack originated or what it ultimately
targets.232 Attacks on cyber systems are often undetectable,233 and the most
dangerous attack is often the one you don’t know is occurring.234 For these
reasons, protecting cyber systems has to be viewed in a different way than
through an SDI-type analogy.
The ability to secure networks is heavily debated235 and beyond the scope
of this paper. However, it is clearly a key foundation of cyber deterrence and
one closely connected with denying the benefit of the attack.236 As Deputy
Secretary Lynn recently commented, “our strategy of securing networks to
deny the benefit of an attack will help dissuade military actors from using
cyberspace for hostile purposes.”237 To the degree that networks can be secure,
the futility of conducting a cyber attack would act as a great deterrent. Even if
only some networks could be secured or if the networks could only be secured
from certain attacks, such actions would deter some attacks and/or some
attackers. Therefore, security will continue to be a foundational element of
cyber deterrence.

231

See Eric Sterner, Retaliatory Deterrence in Cyberspace, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Spring 2011, at 62, 65–

66.
232 Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 589 (2011); Geers, supra note 28, at 301–02;
Natasha Solce, Comment, The Battlefield Of Cyberspace: The Inevitable New Military Branch—The Cyber
Force, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 293, 307–08 (2008).
233 Arnie Heller, Defending Computer Networks Against Attack, SCI. & TECH. REV., Jan./Feb. 2010, at 14,
14–15.
234 Gertz, supra note 104.
235 Compare Lynn, supra note 56 (stating “[a]lthough no network will ever be perfectly secure, our
military networks today are better defended, and our cyber hygiene more effective, than before.”), with Mark
Kaelin, An Absolutely Secure Network Is Not Possible, but the Risk Can Be Managed, TECHREPUBLIC (Aug. 5,
2005), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/an-absolutely-secure-network-is-not-possible-but-the-risk-can-bemanaged/5820491 (noting "it is an unfortunate fact of life that no network can achieve an end-state that is
totally secure. No matter how much you may wish it to be otherwise, network security, regardless of platform,
is a continuous battle where engagement with intruding forces ebbs and flows with the security vulnerability of
the moment. The best you can ultimately achieve is a stalemate where the risk of invasion is at a manageable
level.").
236 Kugler, supra note 31, at 324, 327, 334.
237 Lynn, supra note 56, at 2.
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b. Legal Issues
In addition to the technological concerns, the ability to secure computers
and computer networks also raises significant legal concerns. These concerns
center around the interaction any security measures would have with privatecivilian institutions that facilitate the Internet and with friends, allies, and
partners who might have to interact through these security measures and the
potential technology transfer issues necessary to facilitate that.238 Additionally,
there would inevitably be some legal issues with enforcing the requirements
necessary to maintain that level of security from the threat of employees and
insiders.239 As mentioned above,240 the ability for one state to make itself
impervious to attack may, under international law, significantly affect that
victim nation’s ability to respond in self-defense to an adversary’s actions.
The vast majority of government Internet traffic in the United States flows
over civilian Internet infrastructure. Some accounts have that number as high
as ninety-eight percent.241 The implementation of any security measure to
protect against malicious cyber operations would necessarily affect private
Internet providers.242 However, President Obama has made it clear that he will
not dictate security measures to the private sector. In a recent speech, President
Obama stated:
Let me also be clear about what we will not do. Our pursuit of
cybersecurity will not—I repeat, will not include—monitoring private
sector networks or Internet traffic. We will preserve and protect the
personal privacy and civil liberties that we cherish as Americans.
Indeed, I remain firmly committed to net neutrality so we can keep
243
the Internet as it should be—open and free.

Even if President Obama took a different view, the legality of imposing
specific security measures on private entities is dubious at best,244 though this
is potentially easier with private entities that contract with the government.245
238

See infra notes 241–48 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 249–61 and accompanying text.
240 See supra Section II.A.1.b.iii.
241 Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyberwarfare and Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV.
1533, 1534 (2010) (citing a statement by Michael McConnell, former Director of National Intelligence).
242 Id. at 1555–56.
243 Obama, supra note 17.
244 See Ellen Nakashima, NSA Thwarted in Cybersecurity Initiative, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2012, at A1,
A2; Michelle Richardson, Keep Domestic Cybersecurity Efforts in Civilian Hands, ACLU (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/keep-domestic-cybersecurity-effortscivilian-hands.
239
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Further, if the government imposed security measures, some form of
monitoring of the civilian networks would be required. Governmental
monitoring of the Internet has already been a controversial topic in the past.246
This may explain some of President Obama’s hesitation to regulate civilian
networks. The legality of such government monitoring would be contested and
would certainly have to be made clear before any system was put in place.
Additionally, some in Congress have proposed a “kill switch” option for
the President in cases of large-scale attacks or significant danger to the
infrastructure.247 Such action by the President would not only have a
significant impact on the private sector and implicate the President’s
constitutional authority, but it would also have significant implications on
individual rights.248
Similarly, particularly for government agencies, much of the government’s
communications with allies and partners occurs over the Internet.249 Whatever
security measures the government installs may affect its ability to
communicate with others. For example, if the government develops some
enhanced encryption system, it might require the government to share
technology with allies/partners to ensure that they can receive the encrypted
communications. Any technology transfer of this kind is likely regulated by

245 See Dep’t of Def., News Release: DOD Announces the Expansion of Defense Industrial Base (DIB)
Voluntary Cybersecurity Information Sharing Activities (May 11, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/releases/
release.aspx?releaseid=15266; Elizabeth Ferrell & Erin Sheppard, Interim DoD Regulation Expands Defense
Industrial Base Pilot to Facilitate Government–Industry Cooperation on Cybersecurity, MCKENNA LONG &
ALDRIDGE (May 14, 2012), http://www.mckennalong.com/publications-advisories-2975.html.
246 See David J. Barron, Legality of Intrusion-Detection System to Protect Unclassified Computer
Networks in the Executive Branch, DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/olc/2009/legalityof-e2.pdf; see also Ellen Nakashima, Cybersecurity Plan Doesn’t Breach Employee Privacy, Administration
Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2009, at A16; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
247 Jon Swartz, Should the Internet Have an ‘Off’ Switch? Bill Gives President Power to Shut It Down
During Cyberattack, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 2011, at 1B; see also Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset
Act of 2010, S. 3480, 111th Cong. § 249 (2010). This bill was later revised to become the Cybersecurity and
Internet Freedom Act of 2011, S. 413, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011).
248 Swartz, supra note 247, at 1B; see also Karson K. Thompson, Note, Cybersecurity and the Internet
Kill Switch Debate, 90 TEX. L. REV. 465, 487–88, 491 (2011).
249 Cf. Budget Request for Information Technology and Cyber Operations Programs, supra note 17, at 3
(statement of General Keith B. Alexander, Commander, United States Cyber Command) (discussing the U.S.
Government’s reliance on the accessibility of the Internet).
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various export regimes250 and may require additional legislation to allow such
transfer.
Another potential legal issue with a deterrence strategy based on security of
computers and computer networks is the ability to control and monitor the
personnel who operate the systems. One of the most effective ways to infiltrate
a system with malicious code is to have someone with approved access to the
system accomplish the infiltration.251 This is known generally as the “insider”
problem.252 The idea is that one can avoid many of the security measures that
protect a computer if someone installs malware who already has access to the
system.253 Some have speculated that just such an approach was necessary to
effectuate the Stuxnet malware.254
The U.S. government recognizes the potential use of an insider for
espionage.255 A recent DoD Directive defined the counterintelligence insider
threat as “[a] person, known or suspected, who uses their authorized access to
DoD facilities, personnel, systems, equipment, information, or infrastructure to
damage and disrupt operations, compromise DoD information, or commit
espionage on behalf of a [foreign intelligence entity].”256 The directive places
shared responsibility for protection against the insider threat on
counterintelligence, law enforcement, and antiterrorism forces.257
Trying to protect against the insider threat suggests numerous legal issues,
including searches of employees’ offices, computers, and persons;258
250 Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2010) (providing strict controls on the export of defenserelated materials, including the technical data, to a foreign national or a foreign nation); see also Exec. Order
No. 12591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 10, 1987).
251 See Steven M. Bellovin, The Insider Attack Problem Nature and Scope, in INSIDER ATTACK AND
CYBER SECURITY 1, 1–4 (Salvatore J. Stolfo et al. eds., 2008).
252 Id.; see also DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 5240.26, at 13 (2012) (defining an insider as “[a]nyone
who has authorized access to DoD resources by virtue of employment, volunteer activities, or contractual
relationship with DoD.”).
253 See Bellovin, supra note 251, at 3.
254 Dan Raywood, ‘Iranian Acting for Israel’ Planted Stuxnet Virus, SC MAGAZINE (Apr. 16, 2012),
http://www.scmagazineuk.com/iranian-acting-for-israel-planted-stuxnet-virus/article/236635.
255 See DEP’T. OF DEF., supra note 4, at 3 (discussing at length the danger of the insider and describing the
potential effect as “devastating.”).
256 DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 252, at 13.
257 Id. at 6–9.
258 Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century Framework for Employee
Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 285, 345 (2011); Bryan R. Lemons, Warrantless Workplace Searches of
Government Employees, FED. L. ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER, http://www.fletc.gov/training/programs/
legal-division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/research-by-subject/4th-amendment/workplacesearches.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 10, 2012).
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consensual and non-consensual monitoring in the workplace and nonworkplace;259 and the ability to conduct initial background and continuing
qualifying security checks.260 Consent and waiver will likely play a significant
part in working through these legal issues, but they also have limits based on
reasonableness.261
To be truly effective against an insider, he or she would have to be
monitored not only at work but outside of work and in ways that are likely too
invasive to survive U.S. constitutional review. Therefore, the mitigation of
potential threats may be all the law will allow.
Finally, as mentioned above, if a nation is attacked, but there is no result
due to the security of its systems, the victim nation may have limited its own
lawful ability to respond with countermeasures262 or in self-defense.263 There is
insufficient state practice in this area to determine what would actually be
acceptable,264 but it seems unlikely that a nation would just permit the attacks
and take no responsive action.
2. Resiliency
The idea of resiliency is that a nation’s cyber systems are so durable that an
attack will not actually hurt the victim.265 This type of deterrence will not
necessarily deter adversaries who are after specific information that is resident
on a single target computer or system or who just want to degrade a particular
computer; however, the victim’s resiliency may remove the incentive to attack
if the attacker’s goal is to achieve system-wide degradation or destruction.

259 Michele Morris, Employees’ Fourth Amendment Rights Beyond Their Work Space: The Employment
Relationship as a Source of Privacy Expectations, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 191, 234–35 (2001).
260 THOMAS R. GIMBLE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE DEP’T OF DEF., DOD SECURITY
CLEARANCE ADJUDICATION AND APPEAL PROCESS, passim (2003).
261 Michelle Hess, What’s Left of the Fourth Amendment in the Workplace: Is the Standard of Reasonable
Suspicion Sufficiently Protecting Your Rights?, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 255, 261–71 (2006).
262 Hinkle, supra note 156, at 14–16; see Jensen, supra note 153, at 220 (“[T]he countermeasure must be
commensurate with the injury suffered . . . .”).
263 Moussa, supra note 117, at 973–74 (discussing the limitations necessity and proportionality place on
states acting in self defense).
264 Raduege, supra note 71, at 4.
265 See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4, at 6 (“Operating with a presumption of breach will require DoD to be
agile and resilient, focusing its efforts on mission assurance and the preservation of critical operating
capability.”); see also Taipale, supra note 5 (using futility and subcategories of redundancy and recovery to
describe resiliency).
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Resilience comes in two major categories: redundancy and
reconstitution.266 The ability to continue to function even after a successful
attack (redundancy)267 or to rebuild the system so quickly that the effects of the
successful attack are minimal (reconstitution)268 will deter a certain segment of
those conducting attacks.
a. Redundancy
Redundancy in a system acts as a deterrent to potential attackers because it
limits the ability of an attacker to inhibit functionality of the system.269 When a
cyber system is sufficiently redundant, the attacker may be able to shut down
specific computers or portions of the system, but enough alternative systems
continue to run the required capabilities so that the system is still able to
function.270
In a larger sense, the Internet functions in much the same way. Due to the
architecture of the system, even if a large section were disconnected or stopped
responding in accordance with normal protocols, the Internet is large enough
and constructed in a redundant manner such that it would continue to
function.271 Digital packets would continue to find a path to their required
active destination. Individuals may lose access for a time, but the system
would continue to work.272
Truly redundant cyber systems would make allowance for redundancy even
at the individual–user level. In other words, any function that was necessary
for the system would be performable at multiple points so that one system did

266 Retired United States Air Force Lieutenant General Harry D. Raduege, Jr., calls resilience the first leg
of a new “cyber triad” and defines resilience as “redundancy of critical connectivity; the ability to handle
increased traffic loads, even under the most stressed conditions; and the ability to protect and secure sensitive
and private information.” Raduege, supra note 71, at 4.
267 Taipale, supra note 5.
268 GLASER, supra note 28, at 1. The term “recovery” is used as a synonym for reconstitution. See Taipale,
supra note 5.
269 Taipale, supra note 5; e.g., Budget Request for Information Technology and Cyber Operations
Programs, supra note 17, at 3 (statement of General Keith B. Alexander, Commander, United States Cyber
Command) (“Our strategic objective is to reduce the attack surface of our critical networks that is available to
adversaries, enabling us to ‘Defend and Jump’ as needed.”). The “Defend and Jump” theory represents a
method of redundancy.
270 Taipale, supra note 5.
271 Chuck Yoke, The Internet—Redundant, Reliable, and Risky, NETWORK WORLD (Sept. 5, 2005), http://
www.networkworld.com/columnists/2005/090505yoke.html.
272 Id.
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not represent a single point of failure.273 On a broader scale, system
functionality would be spread over sufficient platforms so that when a segment
of those platforms was degraded, the overall system would continue to
function.274
If a system is sufficiently redundant that attacks do not degrade the
system’s ability to operate, attackers whose intent is to threaten the functioning
of the system will be deterred from attacking. Again, this will not deter all
adversaries, but it will deter a certain section of cyber operators with specific
goals and intentions.
b. Reconstitution
In addition to redundancy, a nation can deter would-be attackers by
increasing its ability to reconstitute after an attack. This is a slightly different
view of resiliency, in that it does not actually mean that the attack will not have
its desired effect in the short term, but rather it means that the nation can
reconstitute so quickly that the effects of the attack are minimal, if felt at all.275
Reconstitution might be accomplished by having a stockpile of computers or
servers that a victim could utilize in the event that his or her normal computer
or server is disabled by an attack.276 Some have suggested that the United
States maintain a “strategic reserve” of bandwidth in the event of a debilitating
attack on government and industry.277 However reconstitution is effectuated,
the key is that the system can suffer an attack and recover in such a way and in
such time that the functionality of the system is not compromised.278
c. Legal Issues
As with other deterrent methods, achieving resilience has many potential
legal issues and implications. The United States’ ability to achieve redundancy
and/or reconstitute after an attack is significantly impacted by domestic law
and regulation. For example, if the government determined that it would
achieve bandwidth redundancy by passing a law allowing the government to
take bandwidth from the private sector in time of need, that action might

273
274
275
276
277
278

Taipale, supra note 5.
Id.
See id. (using the term “recovery” as a synonym for “reconstitution”).
See id.
Jensen, supra note 241, at 1567 & nn.209 & 210.
GLASER, supra note 28, at 1.
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infringe on individual rights. A recent bill proposing a kill switch for the
President in time of emergency279 received concerted opposition because of its
infringement on the private sector and individual rights.280
Additionally, when contemplating the availability of back-up or
replacement systems that could be employed to reconstitute after an attack, the
rules of government purchasing require a bona fide need for every purchase.281
It is unlikely that, without some kind of Congressional fiscal regulation, the
government could purchase large numbers of computers and other spare
systems in case of an attack where spares would be needed.
There are also international legal implications of a resilient system. Under
the current legal paradigm, a state may respond to an attack with a proportional
response.282 Whether that response is a countermeasure to an unlawful use of
force, or an action in self-defense in response to an armed attack, it must be
proportional.283
Much like the similar issue discussed above in reference to security,
assuming that an attack occurs but the system is so resilient that there are no
effects, the targeted state would be very limited in its ability to respond.284
What is a proportionate response to a completely ineffective attack? One might
argue that a proportionate response might still include doing what is necessary
to prevent any future attacks;285 however, this position is not universally
279 See Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010, S. 3840, 111th Cong. § 249 (2010); H.R.
5548, 111th Cong. (2010); Hathaway et al., supra note 5, at 875–76.
280 See Daniel Tencer, Obama May Get Power To Shut Down the Internet Without Court Oversight, RAW
STORY (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/01/24/power-shut-internet-court-oversight.
281 31 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (“The balance of an appropriation or fund limited for obligation to a definite
period is available only for payment of expenses properly incurred during the period of availability or to
complete contracts properly made within that period of availability and obligated consistent with section 1501
of this title. However, the appropriation or fund is not available for expenditure for a period beyond the period
otherwise authorized by law.”).
282 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
283 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
284 See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
285 In response to the April 5, 1986, bombing of a Berlin discothèque by Libyans, U.S. Air and Naval
assets executed Operation El Dorado Canyon and struck targets in and around Tripoli, including an
intelligence headquarters, military bases, airfields, and suspected terrorist training camps. President Ronald
Reagan announced, “[t]hese strikes were conducted in the exercise of our right of self-defense under Article 51
of the United Nations Charter. This necessary and appropriate action was a preemptive strike . . . designed to
deter acts of terrorism by Libya . . . .” Letter from Ronald Reagan, President Of the United States, to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives & the President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the United States Air
Strike Against Libya (Apr. 16, 1986), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
RONALD REAGAN, 1986, at 478 (1988).
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accepted as compliant with international law.286 To the degree that a resilient
system would have a self-limiting effect on a proportionate response by the
victim state, it acts as a disincentive on states to use this form of deterrence.
3. Invisibility
One way to protect oneself from attack is to be invisible to your enemies. If
an adversary cannot find the systems or computers it intends to attack, it will
be deterred from conducting attacks.287 In such a case, it would not matter how
potent an adversary’s weapons might be; if the attacker cannot find the target,
its weapons are ineffective.
a. Hiding the System
Invisibility works as a deterrent because, if the adversary cannot find his
target, he will take his efforts elsewhere. Even if the attacker knows the system
exists, he will have to determine how to allocate his time and resources to try
to locate it. In an environment where there are lots of available targets, systems
that are harder to find will be less likely to be attacked. If the system is
completely invisible, to the extent that is technologically possible, attackers
can search continuously with no chance of success.
Invisibility includes more than just making the existence of the system
invisible; it also includes masking the true nature or attributes of the system.288
This type of invisibility may be more practical. As Martin Libicki wrote in his
work on deterrence prepared for the U.S. Air Force,
By falsely portraying its networks and their contents, DoD can
variously hope to persuade the attacker to direct its energies
elsewhere; hope to misdirect the attacker’s focus; and hope to give
the attacker an exaggerated or understated view of what it has been
able to accomplish—not to mention foster a false impression of its
289
physical capabilities.

Invisibility includes presenting the system as something it is not, either by
making the system look like something else, or by making something else look
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289

See infra Part II.B.3.a.
See infra Part II.B.3.a.
See LIBICKI, supra note 22, at 171–72.
Id.
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like the system.290 The latter approach includes the use of “honeypots,”
spoofed systems meant to lure attackers into a harmless yet apparently valid
system.291 In these cases, the initial attacker may not be deterred, but as the
system becomes known to have these attributes, and as the lack of success of
would-be attackers becomes known, the invisibility mechanisms of the system
will deter future attackers.
b. Legal Issues
Most of the legal issues with this form of deterrence seem to revolve
around hiding the true nature of attributes of the computer system. To the
extent that making a system truly invisible is technologically possible, the
methodology for doing so may raise legal issues, but there do not appear to be
any legal issues inherent in having a system that no one can see or detect.
In contrast, many legal issues arise as someone tries to mask the true nature
of his or her computer systems by representing them as something they are not
or by having other computer systems appear to be his or hers. Taking the
former first, the law requires that belligerents separate, to the maximum extent
feasible, their military objectives from the civilian population.292 The practical
application of this provision of law in the cyber age is a matter of great
discussion,293 but it would seem to clearly preclude purposefully cloaking
military systems as protected civilian systems to hide them from potential
attackers.294
Even more egregious would be any attempt to represent military systems as
systems that receive special protections under the LOAC, such as those
belonging to the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) or
medical or religious computer systems. During an armed conflict, these actions
would most likely be grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and trigger a
nation’s requirements to search out and prosecute those responsible for such
actions.295

290 See, e.g., Lauren Oudet, Fighting Internet Worms with Honeypots, SYMANTEC, http://www.symantec.
com/connect/articles/fighting-internet-worms-honeypots.
291 LIBICKI, supra note 22, at 172–73; Oudet, supra note 290.
292 Protocol I, supra note 120, art. 58.
293 E.g., Jensen, supra note 241, at 1549–52.
294 See, e.g., id.
295 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
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By masking the true nature of computer systems, government—particularly
military—actions undercut the basic LOAC principle of distinction in armed
conflict: combatants have an obligation to have a “fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance” and to “[carry] arms openly.”296 It is unclear how
this principle will be applied by states in the cyber age,297 but it seems to
preclude portraying military computers as civilian computers and conducting
attacks from computers not clearly identifiable as belonging to the military.298
Cyber actions during armed conflict might invoke the principles of ruse and
perfidy,299 particularly if a nation was using or spoofing a protected system,
such as the ICRC, in order to gain advantage based on the adversary’s reliance
on the LOAC. Any such actions would be violations of the LOAC and would
seriously undercut the principle of distinction.300 These principles would apply
equally to defensive measures during armed conflict.
There are also legal issues with having other computers appear to be the
target computers. This might occur if a government knows adversaries are
targeting a system of computers that monitor the logistics movements of
military goods. To protect that system, the government creates another, false
system that appears to be the logistics systems but is populated with false and
misleading data.301 These types of systems are often referred to as
honeypots.302
While there is nothing inherently illegal in using honeypots,303 the method
for attracting adversaries might raise legal issues, as well as any deceptive

Forces at Sea art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6, U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 147,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6, U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
296 Geneva Convention III, supra note 295, art. 4.
297 See Michael N. Schmitt et al., Computers and War: The Legal Battlespace, 11–12 (June 2004)
(working paper) (on file with Harvard Univ. Program on Humanitarian Policy & Conflict Research).
298 The use of attacking with computers on a “.com” domain versus a “.mil” domain needs much more
discussion and analysis amongst both practitioners and academics. Disclosed state practice has been very
limited in this area, making it difficult to address this topic.
299 See Protocol I, supra note 121, art. 37; Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 430–40 (1987).
300 Geneva Convention III, supra note 295, at art. 4; Protocol I, supra note 121, art. 37.
301 See Oudet, supra note 290.
302 Id.
303 Ian Walden & Anne Flanagan, Honeypots: A Sticky Legal Landscape?, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 317, 323–24 (2003) (explaining that the passive presence of a honeypot is insufficient to amount to
entrapment under U.S. law).
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information available in the honey pot. For example, if the honeypot provided
information that misdirected the adversary’s focus and then led the adversary
to attack a protected target such as the ICRC,304 this type of misdirection might
be a violation of the LOAC.305
4. Interdependence
The final method of cyber deterrence discussed in this Article is
interdependence.306 As with others, this method has unique characteristics in
the cyber paradigm. The ability to become digitally interconnected and
interdependent with other nations, including adversaries, has increased
exponentially with the advent of the Internet.307 The DoD recognizes that
“[t]he development of international shared situational awareness and warning
capabilities will enable collective self-defense and collective deterrence.”308
Interdependence is a broad proposition and can occur over a multitude of
genres. The Internet has facilitated interconnectedness in finances,309
science,310 the arts,311 and a host of other fields that facilitate state governance
and provide a richer life experience to citizens.312 This interdependence has led
to some inherent disincentives for states and non-state actors to conduct cyber
attacks.
During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States contemplated
conducting a cyber attack on Saddam Hussein’s financial networks.313 It

304

Geneva Convention I, supra note 295, arts. 24, 26.
See id. (explaining that members of the ICRC are entitled to the same protections as medical personnel
engaged in providing aid).
306 See Taipale, supra note 5, at 39–40.
307 See id.
308 See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4, at 9. The DoD also claims, “[e]very year, an amount of intellectual
property larger than that contained in the Library of Congress is stolen from networks maintained by U.S.
businesses, universities, and governmental departments and agencies.” Id. at 4.
309 Global Internet Users Manage Finances (59%), Shop (48%), and Look for Jobs (41%) Online, IPSOS
(Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.ipsos-na.com/news-polls/pressrelease.aspx?id=5573.
310 See Ian Peter, So, Who Really Did Invent the Internet?, NETHISTORY, http://www.nethistory.info/
History%20of%20the%20Internet/origins.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2012).
311 Mary Madden, Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, Presentation to the Chicago Wallace Audience
Engagement Network: The Internet and the Arts: How New Technology Affects Old Aesthetics (Apr. 22,
2008), available at http://www.slideshare.net/tchoubar/the-internet-andthearts42208.
312 Duncan Cornell Card, The Internet and Democratic Stability: The Legal Challenge To Face the
Threat, 56 U.N.B. L.J. 22, 22–23 (2007) (Can).
313 John Markoff & Thom Shanker, U.S. Weighs Risks of Civilian Harm in Cyberwarfare, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2009, at A1.
305
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appears the attack was not carried out because “Bush administration officials
worried that the effects would not be limited to Iraq but would instead create
worldwide financial havoc, spreading across the Middle East to Europe and
perhaps the United States.”314 This type of interdependence might not only act
as a deterrent on attackers but also on those who retaliate in response to a prior
attack.315
Importantly, not all forms of interdependence are desirable. The DoD
Cyberspace strategy acknowledges the danger to supply chains from too much
interdependence.316 For example, some of the United States’ key materiel
components are only manufactured in adversary nations such as China.317
Supply chain liabilities are a serious concern that should be balanced with the
potential benefits to deterrence.
a. Sharing the Pain
The increasing level of interdependence allows a target nation to argue to
the attacker that hurting the target state equally hurts the attacker.318
Arguments such as this admittedly have much more impact on nations than on
non-state actors, but even some non-state actors might be persuaded that
attacking certain aspects of an area of interconnectedness, such as the target
state’s economic power, may have significant impacts on the non-state actor’s
ability to accomplish its overall objectives.
The most obvious candidates for this method of deterrence are nations that
share the same currency (such as the Euro)319 or are actively engaged in a trade
agreement, such as members of the European Union320 or the North American
Free Trade Agreement.321 However, this could also be effective between
potential cyber adversaries such as the United States and China or the United
States and Russia. China is now the top-trading partner for imports and second
314

Id.
Tang & Zhang, supra note 12, at 1–2.
316 DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 4, at 8.
317 Scott Hamilton, Outsourcing U.S. Defense: National Security Implications–UPDATED, NAT’L DEF.
(Jan. 2011), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/January/Pages/OutsourcingUSDefense
NationalSecurityImplications.aspx.
318 Taipale, supra note 5, at 39–40.
319 Preface to THE EURO AND THE DOLLAR IN A GLOBALIZED ECONOMY xvii (Joaquin Roy & Pedro
Gomis-Porqueras eds., 2007).
320 Basic Information on the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basicinformation/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
321 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (1993).
315
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for total trade with the United States,322 and Russia is the twentieth.323 Much of
this trade is carried out via cyber systems.324 While this global economic
interdependence has proven insufficient to prevent these countries from using
cyber means to steal large amounts of commercial and economic data from
U.S. businesses,325 it undoubtedly disincentivizes both Russia and China to
take actions that would significantly harm the U.S. economy and, in particular,
the ability of U.S. citizens to conduct cyber commerce. This is exemplified by
the experience of the U.S. in the 2003 Iraq War mentioned above.326 The
interdependence within the financial system of the United States and its allies
was enough to deter the United States from attacking Saddam Hussein’s
finances.327
The same argument works to lesser degrees with countries with which the
United States’ trade is less. Increasing the economic and other interdependence
with these countries may increase the incentive for them to prevent serious
cyber attacks that emanate from within their borders that would have serious
effects on the United States.
Additionally, countries like China and Russia, which are now the attackers,
may quickly become the attacked, necessitating increased cooperation.328 In a
recent visit by Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Liang Guanglie, he and U.S.
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta “discussed ways their countries can ‘jointly
work’ to boost cybersecurity . . . .”329

322 U.S. Trade Balance, by Partner Country 2011, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, http://dataweb.usitc.gov/
scripts/cy_m3_run.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2011); see also Ryan Fisher, U.S.–China Cyber Policy: Fighting
a Tiger with Wings (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
323 U.S. Trade Balance, by Partner Country 2011, supra note 322.
324 Caroline L. Freund & Diana Weinhold, The Effect of the Internet on International Trade, 62 J. INT’L
ECON. 171, 171–72 (2004).
325 Budget Request for Information Technology and Cyber Operations Programs, supra note 17, at 3
(statement of General Keith B. Alexander, Commander, United States Cyber Command); Foreign Spies
Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace, OFFICE OF NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC. (Oct. 2011),
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection_2011.pdf; Lisa Daniels,
DOD Needs Industry’s Help to Catch Cyber Attacks, Commander Says, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. (Mar. 27,
2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67713.
326 See supra notes 313–15 and accompanying text.
327 Markoff & Shanker, supra note 313, at A1.
328 See Adrian Croft, Russia Says Many States Arming for Cyber Warfare, REUTERS, Apr. 25, 2012,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/germany-cyber-idUSL6E8FP40M20120425 (noting
that while Russia has allegedly used cyber espionage against the United States, it now supports a globally
binding treaty on cyber security).
329 Bill Gertz, PLA General Denies Cyber War, WASH. TIMES (May 9, 2012), http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/9/inside-the-ring-pla-general-denies-cyberwar; see also Cheryl Pellerin,
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b. Legal Issues
Legal issues in this area revolve mostly around gaining and maintaining
interdependence. In order to gain cyber interdependence and its resulting
deterrence, the United States may have to engage in technology transfer, as
discussed above.330 In the past, the United States has been hesitant to share
technology,331 such as encryption,332 and has prevented such transfers. Over
time, the United States has relaxed those restrictions,333 but future
developments might trigger similar legal impediments in the future.
Similarly, when the United States allows the sale of sensitive technology, it
usually requires the receiving nation to make commitments to not transfer that
technology any further.334 A similar regime might exist in the case of
technology designed to facilitate interdependence, causing the establishment of
some means of verification that no further transfer to another nation or entity
takes place.
Another legal issue with increasing interdependence is liability. As
networks and systems become more interdependent, determining liability for
damage and/or losses becomes more difficult.335 This is true due to cascading
effects on interdependent systems, as was the worry in the case of the aborted
Iraq attack,336 but also because some issues may be caused simply from the
intertwining of multiple systems and their interaction. Establishing a basis for
determining legal liability for losses and damage will present a technological
and diplomatic hurdle.

U.S., China Must Work Together on Cyber, Panetta Says, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. (May 7, 2012), http://
www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116235.
330 See supra Part III.B.1.b.
331 See Matthew Crane, U.S. Export Controls on Technology Transfers, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
0030, ¶¶ 4–7; Steven R. Weisman, Tech Sales to China Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 1, 2012, at C1; Illegal
Technology Transfer, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRI., http://www.dm.usda.gov/ocpm/Security%20Guide/T1threat/
Techtran.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
332 See Ira S. Rubinstein & Michael Hintze, Export Controls on Encryption Software, in COPING WITH
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS, 2000, at 505 (Evan R. Berlack & Cecil Hunt eds., 2000).
333 See Crane, supra note 331, ¶ 2.
334 See Mal Zerden, Presentation, Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (on file with
author); Third Party Transfers, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T DEF. http://www.defence.gov.au/deco/transfers.htm (last
visited Sept. 19, 2011).
335 See Taipale, supra note 5, at 30.
336 Markoff & Shanker, supra note 313, at A1.
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CONCLUSION
Just as the end of the Cold War did not mark the permanent cessation of
hostilities,337 it also did not end the need for deterrence. In the emerging cyber
age, nations are subject to attacks in new and innovative ways, representing
significant national security threats.338 Even as cyber capabilities provide
unique and innovative tools to accomplish national goals,339 they also allow for
distinctive methods of deterrence, both similar to traditional deterrence
methodologies, such as retaliation, and some methodologies that are new and
innovative, such as invulnerability, invisibility, resiliency, and
interdependence.340 As nations work to develop these methods of cyber
deterrence, they will need to be cognizant of corresponding legal issues that
will naturally arise.
These legal issues include aspects of international law, the LOAC, and U.S.
domestic law. By understanding the theories of deterrence and their
corresponding legal issues, nations can expand the role of cyber deterrence and
work to accomplish national objectives more effectively in the cyber age.

337 Charles A. Kupchan, NATO’s Final Frontier: Why Russia Should Join the Atlantic Alliance, FOREIGN
AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2010, at 100, 100–01.
338 See Adams, supra note 121, at 98–99.
339 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
340 See supra Part II.B.

